Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for Net Neutrality and an Open Competitive Internet by Selwyn, Lee L. & Golding, Helen E.
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 63 | Issue 1 Article 8
12-2010
Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband
Internet Access: A Policy Framework for Net
Neutrality and an Open Competitive Internet
Lee L. Selwyn
Economics and Technology, Inc.
Helen E. Golding
Economics and Technology, Inc.
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons,
Communications Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Selwyn, Lee L. and Golding, Helen E. (2010) "Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for
Net Neutrality and an Open Competitive Internet," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 63: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol63/iss1/8
Revisiting the Regulatory Status of
Broadband Internet Access:
A Policy Framework for Net
Neutrality and an Open Competitive
Internet
Lee L. Selwyn*
Helen E. Golding"*
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................ 92
11. NEITHER FACT, POLICY, NOR PRECEDENT SUPPORT THE
CLASSIFICATION OF BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS AS
ANYTHING BUT A BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE .... 94
A. The Slippery Slope ............................................ 94
B. Longstanding Policies Requiring the Separation of
Common Carrier Telecommunications from
Information Services Should Apply Equally to Next
Generation Technology.................................... 101
C. Is Today's Broadband Internet Access an Information
*Lee L. Selwyn, founder and president of Economics and Technology, Inc., Boston,
is an economist specializing in telecommunications policy and regulation, whose work in
this field dates back to the late 1960s. Ph.D., Alfred P. Sloan School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969; B.A., Economics, Queens College (CUNY),
1962.
** Helen E. Golding is vice president of Economics and Technology, Inc. She has been
actively involved in telecommunications law and public policy since 1976. I.D., Boston
University School of Law, 1977; A.B., Bryn Mawr College, cum laude, 1974.
91
92 ~FEDERAL COMMIUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL [o.6
Service or Simply Basic Transmission?................. 106
111. TECHNOLOGY-BASED CLAIMS THAT BROADBAND
INTERNET ACCESS IS AN INFORMATION SERVICE............. 107
A. "Bundled" Information Services .......................... 107
B. Domain Name Services ................................... 111.II
C. Technology Transitions Are an Ongoing Part of
Telecommunications Industry Progress................. 114
D. Neither Its Eventual Destination (on the Public
Internet) nor Its Bandwidth (Speed) Set Broadband
Internet Access Apart from Other Last-Mile
Telecommunications Services............................. 116
E. Regulating the Underlying Transmission in Internet
Access Services is Not, and Would Not Amount to or
Result in, the Regulation of Content or Application
Providers.................................................... 119
IV. ECONOMIC REALITIES REQUIRE REGULATORY SUPPORT
FOR NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS BY COMPETITORS TO
BROADBAND TRANSMISSION USED FOR INTERNET ACCESS. 120
A. Regardless of the Technology in the Upstream Network,
Access Facilities Remain a Bottleneck .................. 121
B. Reevaluation of FCC Competition Analysis Needs to
Extend to Broadband Access.............................. 129
C. Reconciling Recent FCC Decisions with Existing
Policies on Broadband Internet Access................. 131
V. CONCLUSION: NET NEUTRALITY CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED
BY THE FULL RESTORATION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY
ACCESS To BROADBAND LAST-MILE FACILITIES............ 136
1. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit recently shut down the FCC's attempt to impose "net neutrality"
principles on the Internet access provider Comcast,' the FCC was forced to
confront the fact that a decade's worth of steps on the slippery slope of
broadband access deregulation had led the FCC to an unforeseen and
ultimately untenable destination, where it was unable to enforce the
fundamental principles of common carrier regulation necessary to ensure
that all Internet content and application providers-including those not
1. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008), vacated by Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
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affiliated with the owners of Internet access facilities-were ensured
reasonable and nondiscriminatory use of those facilities. The FCC had
arrived at its current dilemma through an unfortunate combination of (1)
unverified predictive judgments associating deregulation with investment;
(2) fanciful notions about a gold rush of competitive entry into the
consumer broadband market; (3) the abandonment of the decades-old
"bright line" between common carrier transmission functions and
competitive services that any provider could furnish using that basic
transmission (i.e., telecommunications); and (4) the elimination of
unbundling requirements for services over broadband facilities. The FCC
needs now to revisit-and revise-the factual, legal, and policy judgments
that have brought it to the current situation. The Chairman of the FCC has
proposed that the regulatory oversight the FCC considers necessary for net
neutrality can be restored by reclassifying Internet access as
"telecommunications services," 2 but under his proposed "Third Way," the
FCC would apply and enforce "only a handful of provisions of Title II .
This Article explains why dedicated Internet access is a
telecommunications service and, as such, why reclassification to Title 11
must be pursued to correct its earlier-and incorrect-treatment as an
"information service." More importantly, it explains why reclassification
alone will not be sufficient to assure a competitive and open Internet, and
why an approach that restores competitor access to common carrier
broadband facilities for purposes of offering Internet access to their own
retail customers remains the best strategy for achieving this goal. To be
effective, these policies need to be applied regardless of the transmission
medium or the regulatory status of the incumbent service provider; for
example, incumbent local telephone exchange carriers (ILECs), incumbent
cable companies, and wireless carriers that furnish Internet access must be
embraced within this framework. To reach this result, the FCC needs to
admit to factual errors underlying its broadband Internet access decisions of
the past decade, but it also needs to admit to factual errors underlying its
pervasive deregulation of broadband access facilities. The FCC stands a
2. Julius Genachowski, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework,
FCC, 4 (May 6, 2010), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attachmatch/DOC-
297944A1 .pdf.
3. Id at 5. The legal analysis supporting the Chairman's proposal was first laid out in
an accompanying statement by the FCC's General Counsel. See Austin Schlick, A Third-
Way Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma, FCC (May 6, 2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attachmatch/DOC-297945AI .pdf [hereinafter Schlick
Third-Way Memorandum]. And a yet more detailed analysis followed in the form of a
Notice of Inquiry adopted by the FCC in June 2010. Framework for Broadband Internet
Service, Notice of Inquiry, GN Docket 10-127, 2010 FCC LEXIS 3649 (June 17, 2010),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC- 10-1 14A1 .pdf.
3Number 1]
94 ~FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JO URNA L o.6
better chance of attaining its goals of net neutrality and competitive Internet
access if it combines reclassification with a requirement for unbundled
access to all network elements necessary for nonfacilities-based providers
to offer retail Internet access in competition with the retail services
currently available solely from incumbent facilities-based providers.
II. NEITHER FACT, POLICY, NOR PRECEDENT SUPPORT THE
CLASSIFICATION OF BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS AS
ANYTHING BUT A BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
A. The Slippery Slope
The first step along the slippery slope came, innocently enough,
shortly after passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1 996 4 (1996 Act or
TA96), in the context of the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service
Report to Congress (the so-called Stevens Report).5 As it evaluated the
various potential sources for federal universal service funding, the FCC
was confronted with the primary question of whether to classify Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) as providers of telecommunications services
subject to assessment under the federal Universal Service Fund (USF),
pursuant to the specific directives of the 1996 Act.6 Given its focus at the
time, the FCC was basically trying to decide whether information services
should be included in the USF funding base because they contained a
"telecommunications" component. In the Stevens Report, the FCC
expressed the view that ISPs were furnishing information, and not
telecommunications, services, and that the intent of the 1996 Act was not to
"break out" the telecommunications component of an information service
so as to subject it to a separate universal service support obligation.7 After
all, as the Commission noted, in most cases, the ISP purchased the
underlying transmission as a telecommunications service, from a common
carrier; whatever "telecommunications" was incorporated into the
information service was thus already contributing to the USF base. The
Conmmission went on to find that this treatment was consistent with the fact
that the definitional structure for "telecommunications services" and
"information services" in the 1996 Act, which-like the Computer Inquiry
II framework on which it was based--contained two separate (and thus
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
5. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501 (1998) [hereinafter Stevens Report].
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996. The questions that Congress directed the FCC to
address in its Report to Congress are described at note 1 of the Report. Stevens Report,
supra note 5, at para. 1 n. 1.
7. Stevens Report, supra note 5, at paras. 33, 43.
94 [V l. 63
Number 1] BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS 9
mutually exclusive) definitions for an "information service" and a
"telecommunications service." 8 In its Report, the FCC stated: "We find
generally, however, that Congress intended to maintain a regime in which
information service providers are not subject to regulation as common
carriers merely because they provide their services 'via
telecommunications."' 9
Several key distinctions of fact and context make the analysis
contained in the Stevens Report a poor basis for the FCC's subsequent
decision to permit facilities-based common carriers (including providers of
cable telephony) to provide "integrated" Internet access services
exclusively as deregulated information services. Most importantly, while
the FCC undoubtedly intended to continue its policy of shielding
competitive information service providers from common carrier regulation,
it unequivocally also intended to preserve the long-standing Computer
Inquiry 11 requirement that facilities-based common carriers make the
transmission (telecommunications) component of any information service
available to competitor ISPs on a non-discriminatory, common carrier
basis.'0 This carefully preserved the twin policies that ensured (1) that non-
8. Id at para. 13 (citing Computer Inquiry 11, Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer Inquiry HI or Computer III, modified, 84
F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), reconsidered in 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (198 1), affd sub nom. Computer and
Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 461 U.S. 938 (1983)). The terms "basic" and "enhanced" services in
Computer Inquiry HI correspond to the terms "telecommunications" and "information"
services in the 1996 Act. Stevens Report, supra note 5, at para. 33 (citing Implementation of
the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of
1934, as Amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11I
F.C.C.R. 21905, para. 102 (1996) (subsequent case history omitted)). Earlier, the Computer
Inquiry HI framework was incorporated into the terms of the court-supervised Consent
Decree that ended the decades-old antitrust proceeding against AT&T. United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), afd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). See Stevens Report, supra note 5, at para. 42 n.85.
9. Stevens Report, supra note 5, at para. 13. As Kevin Werbach, who headed the
FCC's Internet policy development in the period following the 1996 Act, explained:
The issue before the Commission in these early decisions was whether an
information-service provider could be found to engage in telecommunications; the
issue was not whether telecommunications-service providers could be classified as
offering information services. Although the possibility existed that incumbent
operators could switch to Internet-protocol-based transmission, the FCC did not
consider this possibility a serious threat to the regulatory structure.
Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORN'ELL L. REv. 535, 543 (2010).
10. Commenting on these objectives, the FCC stated:
As long as the underlying market for provision of transmission facilities is
competitive or is subject to sufficient pro-competitive safeguards, we see no need
to regulate the enhanced functionalities that can be built on top of those facilities..
.. Limiting carrier regulation to those companies that provide the underlying
transport ensures that regulation is minimized and is targeted to markets where
fuill competition has not emerged.
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ILEC providers of ISP services would be shielded from common carrier
status merely because they incorporated "telecommunications" as an input
to their end (information service) product, and (2) that the WLEC could not
escape its common carrier obligations with regard to the
"telecommunications" component of its information services merely by
contaminating the transmission with content or processing enhancements.
This approach was also completely consistent with the nature of ISPs
and ISP services at the time of the Stevens Report."1 At that time,
subscribers to the major ISPs were required to provide their own "last
mile" connection, usually accomplished on a dial-up basis utilizing the
subscriber's home (or business) local telephone service. As such, and
unlike today's principal providers of broadband Internet access, dial-up
ISPs did not provide last-mile telecommunications services to their
customers. According to the FCC,
In essential aspect, Internet access providers look like other enhanced
or information - service providers. Internet access providers, typically,
own no telecommunications facilities. Rather, in order to provide those
components of Internet access services that involve information
transport, they lease lines, and otherwise acquire telecommunications,
from telecommunications providers - interexchange carriers,
incumbent local exchange carriers, competitive local exchange
carriers, and others. 12
Moreover, although these ISPs redirected a small portion of their end
users' traffic to the public Internet, ISPs at the time of the Stevens Report
typically continued their traditional "information services provider" role of
offering end users enhanced functionalities, on the ISP's own host
computers.'13 In other words their principal business continued to be to "add
value" to the underlying transmission, rather than simply to provide a
connection for users' access to independent, third-party content. Thus, both
the nature of ISPs' businesses and the regulatory framework that applied
Stevens Report, supra note 5, at para. 95. Similarly, with respect to the collection of USF,
the FCC stated both "that the provision of transmission capacity to Internet access providers
and Internet backbone providers is appropriately viewed as 'telecommunications service' or
'telecommunications' rather than 'information service,' and that the provision of such
transmission should also generate contribution to universal service support mechanisms." Id.
at para. 15.
11. Stevens Report, supra note 5, at para. 63 ("Major Internet access providers include
America Online, AT&T WorldNet, Netcom, Earthlink, and the Microsoft Network.").
12. Id. at para. 8 1.
13. The role of an Internet access provider has much more in common with the
functions associated with earlier enhanced/information services providers than with Internet
access services offered by ILECs, cable companies, and wireless carriers over their last-mile
transmission facilities. Id. at para. 76 ("Internet access providers typically provide their
subscribers with the ability to run a variety of applications, including World Wide Web
browsers, FTP clients, Usenet newsreaders, electronic mail clients, Telnet applications, and
others.").
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continued to reflect the decades old Computer II framework.'14
The first significant deviation from the Computer II framework came
in the FCC's 2002 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling.'15 In that proceeding,
the FCC dealt specifically with Internet access over broadband facilities
that were owned by the provider of the Internet access service. This case
had another novel characteristic, however, in that the owner of the
broadband transmission facility at issue was a cable television company,
traditionally subject to regulation under Title VI of the Communications
Act of 1934 for its "cable service."'16 In the Cable Modem Ruling, the FCC
declared that "cable modem service, as it is currently offered, is properly
classified as an interstate information service, not as a cable service, and
that there is no separate offering of telecommunications service."17 in
finding cable modem service to be a highly integrated offering of
information services with telecommunications, the FCC referred back to
the analysis in the Stevens Report, particularly highlighting applications
resident on the ISP's own host computers (e.g., e-mail) as well as a
function known as "Domain Name Service" (DNS).
14. Computer Inquiry Iff-a revision to the Computer 11 rules initiated in 1985 and
developed over most of the next decade-relaxed the mechanism for separating the Bell
operating companies' basic and enhanced services from a fully structural approach to a
nonstructural, accounting-based approach and addressed the treatment of certain specific
services. However, the definitional framework and principal objectives of Computer II were
retained. See Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) [hereinafter
Computer Inquiry III or Computer Il1], reconsidered in 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987),
reconsidered in 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988), reconsidered in 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), vacated
and remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990); Amendment to
Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry),
Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987), reconsidered in 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988),
reconsidered in 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), vacated, California I, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990); Computer III Remand Proceedings, 5 F.C.C.R. 7719 (1990), reconsidered in 7
F.C.C.R. 909 (1992), petitions for review denied, California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir.
1993); Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards and Tier 1
Local Exchange Company Safeguards, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991); BOC Safeguards Order,
vacated in part and remanded, California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. dented,
514 U.S. 1050 (1995).
15. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798
(2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling], aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable &
Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
16. The term "cable service" under the Communications Act refers to "(A) the one-way
transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming service, and
(B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of such video
programming or other programming service ... "Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §
602(6), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)). Cable modem service,
with or without the bundling of Internet applications and content, plainly does not fall
within this definition.
17. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 7.
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Although it pinned its factual analysis on these few specific functions,
it became clear around this time that the FCC was actually pursuing
broadband deregulation as part of a broader policy shift. The Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling quotes from the recently released Wi reline Broadband
Internet Services NPRM in which the FCC expressed that, as a policy
matter, "broadband services should exist in a minimal regulatory
environment that promotes investment and innovation in a competitive
market."' 8 Although the FCC purported to anchor this policy shift on the
rather ill-defined section 706 mandate to "promote advanced services,," 9
the Commission did a poor job of analyzing or explaining why the newness
or speed of broadband services made any consequential difference with
respect to the long-standing economic objectives for common carrier
regulation of the transmission services of providers that owned access
facilities
When challenged to require the cable companies to offer the
transmission component of the cable modem service separate from any
"enhanced" functionalities, the FCC weakly explained that (1) Computer II
(which would have required this result in the case of IiLECs) had never
been applied to cable companies,20 and (2) in any event, if the requirement
existed, the FCC was prepared to waive it.2' In BrandX, the Supreme Court
affirmed the FCC's decision on a six-to-three vote, largely in deference to
the agency's expertise.2 The dissent in Brand X was unconvinced by the
FCC's conclusion that the cable company was not "offering" a
telecommunications service, and it observed that
The merger of the physical connection and Internet functions in cable's
offerings has nothing to do with the "inextricably intertwined"...
nature of the two . . . . but is an artificial product of the cable
company's marketing decision not to offer the two separately, so that
the Commission could .. , exempt it from common-carrier status. 23
18. Id. at para. 5 (citing Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, para. 5 (2002)
[hereinafter Wireline Broadband NPRM). There is also no analysis in either the Cable
Modem Declaratory Ruling or the Wireline Broadband NPRM that shows that broadband
investment and innovation (the section 706 objectives purportedly relied upon by the FCC)
either require or directly benefit from minimal regulation, and the FCC has never conducted
a formal evaluation to confirm this prediction. Nonetheless, over time, the "investment" part
of this objective has come to greatly overshadow the "innovation" and "competitive market"
elements of the policy framework.
19. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, at para. 4 (citing section 706 of
the 1996 Act).
20. Id. at para. 43.
2 1. Idat para. 45.
22. Nat'l Cable & Teleconrm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989
(2005).
23. Id. at 1009-10 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation om-itted). It is noteworthy that the
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. (CRTC) has adopted a
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Soon after Brand X, seeking to establish "parity" (vis-ci-vis cable) in
the treatment of ILEC-provided broadband Internet access services, the
FCC compounded the errors in its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling by
extending the same faulty reasoning to ILEC-provided consumer
broadband services.2 " The FCC once again reached back to the analysis in
the 1998 Stevens Repor25 without probing the extensive industry evolution
that had occurred in the intervening seven years. Thus, echoing its earlier
discussion of the "integration" of transmission and information services26
and of the nature of DNS 27 (both discussed in more detail below), the FCC
reached the conclusion that ILEC broadband Internet access services were
"information services." However, with an ILEC-provided information
service, the FCC also had to confront its twenty-five-year-old rule that
required "facilities-based common carriers to provide the basic
transmission services underlying their enhanced services on a
nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to tariffs governed by Title 11 of the Act,"
such that they "offered the underlying basic service at the same prices,
terms, and conditions, to all enhanced service providers, including their
own enhanced services operations, ,2 8 In order to reach the desired result-
deregulated 1LEC broadband Internet access with no requirement for the
unbundling of the underlying transmission-the FCC also needed to
remove this longstanding Computer II rule. To reach this result, the FCC
relied upon the purported technological differences between the broadband
environment and "traditional" wireline telecommunications, 2 9 together with
unverified claims that unbundling would interfere with investment
incentives .30 The FCC also relied upon predictive judgments about the state
of competition for broadband access to the Internet3 1 and assurances from
the iLECs that they had incentives to, and therefore would, retain
very different approach to the classification and regulation of Internet access facilities. The
CRTC has had long-standing requirements for competitor access to ILEC and cable
company high-speed access facilities for the purposes of supporting retail competition for
Internet access services, a policy that it has recently reaffirmed and broadened. See
generally Wholesale High-Speed Access Services Proceeding, Telecom Regulatory Policy,
CRTC 20 10-632 (Aug. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC].
24. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005)
[hereinafter B WIA Order].
25. Id. at n. 16.
26. Id. at para. 9.
27. Id. at para. 15.
28. Id. at para. 24.
29. See id. at paras. 32-40. Ironically, the FCC emphasized these artificial
technological distinctions while at the same time proclaiming its intention to adopt a
technology-neutral policy (as between various broadband platforms). Id. at n.342.
30. See id. at paras. 19, 44.
3 1. Id. at para. 62.
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wholesale access offerings in the absence of regulatory compulsion.3 In
choosing to abandon common carrier regulation of the telecommunications
component of Internet access, the FCC specifically relied upon being able
to enforce non-discrimination requirements with respect to Internet access
provided by facilities-based carriers (such as IILECs and cable companies)
via its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of the Act.3 In fact, the FCC
adopted its first formal net neutrality policy statemen t3 4 on the same day as
its B WIA Order.35
In Comcast v. Federal Communications Commission, the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit told the FCC that the FCC's reliance upon
ancillary jurisdiction as a broad-brush justification for requiring ISPs to
comply with net neutrality principles was misplaced.3 Following the
32. Id. at para. 63. Large ILECs and cable providers (including Cox, SBC (now
AT&T), and Verizon), had assured the FCC that their ability to protect consumers would not
be eroded by classifying broadband Internet access under Title 1, rather than Title 11. See
Schlick Third-Way Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4. Moreover, the "voluntary" Merger
Conditions in the SBC-AT&T, Verizon-MCI, and AT&T-BellSouth mergers required only
temporary compliance with the net neutrality principles contained in its Internet Policy
Statement. See, e.g., SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval
of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18290, app. F (2005)
(stating under "Conditions," "Net Neutrality[:] 1. Effective on 'the Merger Closing Date, and
continuing for two years thereafter, SBC/AT&T will conduct business in a manner that
comports with the principles set forth in the FCC's Policy Statement, issued September 23,
2005 (FCC 05-151)."); Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc. Applications for
Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18433,
app. F (2005) (stating under "Conditions," "Net Neutrality[:] 1. Effective on the Merger
Closing Date, and continuing for two years thereafter, VerizonlMCl will conduct business in
a manner that comports with the principles set forth in the FCC's Policy Statement, issued
September 23, 2005 (FCC 05-15 1).").
33. See BWIA Order, supra note 24, at para. 24 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996 (2005) (stating that the FCC "remains free to
impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary
jurisdiction")); see also Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028, paras. 14-17 (2008).
34. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005) [hereinafter Internet Policy
Statement].
35. See B WIA Order, supra note 24.
36. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Werbach argues,
however, that the FCC's error arises from its attempt to anchor ancillary jurisdiction to
section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, rather than other provisions-
in particular, sections 251 (Interconnection) and 256 (Standards). Werbach, supra note 9, at
571. While finding against the FCC on the Comcast BitTorrent matter, the D.C. appeals
court specifically acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Brand X had stated that "the
Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on [facilities-based ISPs
including cable Internet providers] under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction" and that, "1[ijn
particular, the Court suggested that the Commission could likely 'require cable companies
to allow independent ISPs access to their facilities' pursuant to its ancillary authority, rather
than using Title II as Brand X urged." Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 649 (citing Brand X, 545
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Comcast decision, the current FCC began looking for a way to restore its
authority to enforce the principle of nondiscrimination by reinstating its
jurisdiction over the transmission component of broadband Internet access,
but without also having to resurrect all aspects of Title 11 regulation. Not
long after the FCC General Counsel and Chairman had articulated the legal
and policy rationale for this "third way" of approaching the regulation of
Internet access,3 the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry "to consider the
adequacy of the current legal framework within which the Commission
promotes investment and innovation in, and protects consumers of,
broadband Internet service." 38 Opponents have opined that the FCC has no
legal authority to revise its classification of Internet access services,
because nothing has changed 39 since the original Title I classification was
adopted.
As we demonstrate below, the "facts" relied upon by the FCC when it
had decided to treat broadband wireline and cable Internet access as
information services did not accurately reflect the nature of Internet access,
even then, and with evolution of Internet access services since that time,
the factual basis for that classification is even less appropriate today. The
FCC coupled its classification mistake with erroneous findings and
"predictive judgments" about the extent of competition for broadband
access services generally, and for broadband Internet access in particular.
The policies that the FCC adopted based upon these mistaken assumptions
should not be perpetuated simply because they are the most recent
"6precedents" on these subjects. After all, these relatively new policies take
the place of sounder, time-tested regulatory frameworks that the FCC
should not have abandoned in the first place.
B. Longstanding Policies Requiring the Separation of Common
Carrier Telecommunications from Information Services Should
Apply Equally to Next Generation Technology
In its seminal 1980 Computer Inquiry II decision,4 the FCC crafted a
regulatory paradigmi in which all telecommunications services under its
jurisdiction were to be classified into one of only two categories-either
"basic"~ or "enhanced": "In defining the difference between basic and
U.S. at 996, 1002).
37. See Genachowski, supra note 2.
38. Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 7866,
para. 1 (2010), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjublic/attachmatch/FCC-10-
114A1.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Comments of Seth Waxman, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future,
GN Docket No. 09-5 1; Preserving the Open Internet, ON Docket No. 09-19 1; Broadband
Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52 (rel. Apr. 28, 2010).
40. Computer Inquiry 1, supra note 8.
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enhanced services, we have concluded that basic transmission services are
traditional common carrier communications services and that enhanced
services are not."4' Historically, common carriers-whether involved in
transportation or telecommunications-were expected to carry the sender's
goods or messages without modification, so that they arrived at the
destination in an unaltered condition. "Basic service" embodied that same
connotation: even though the signal (e.g., voice, data, image) might be
manipulated to facilitate its transport, it would be restored to its original
form prior to its delivery.4
Defined most simply under the FCC's dichotomy, "enhanced
services" are not basic services. With an "enhanced" telecommunications
service, the intelligence handed over to the service provider would be acted
upon or manipulated in some manner before its ultimate delivery. In
Computer II, the FCC undertook to codify this distinction between "basic"
and "enhanced" services:
We find that basic service is limited to the common carrier offering of
transmission capacity for the movement of information, whereas
enhanced service combines basic service with computer processing
applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar
aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information.
The framework adopted by the FCC in Computer II recognized the
importance of common carriage as a neutral platform for innovation, and
created a simple but effective means of protecting nonfacilities-based
providers in competition with owners of transmission facilities. Under this
framework, the FCC successfully unbundled and deregulated customer
4 1. Id. at para. 119.
42. Indeed, the definition of "basic" when used in telecommunications was actually
construed more strictly than in certain transportation carriage situations. For example, when
transporting oil or natural gas through a pipeline, the pipeline carrier's obligation is not to
deliver the actual oil or actual gas molecules delivered to it by the shipper, but only to
deliver the equivalent quantity of the commodity, adjusted to account for variations in grade
or other attributes, to its recipient. Similarly, electric distribution utilities that offer their
customers the ability to separately purchase their electricity from any of several sources,
furnish the consumer with the same volume of electricity (kWh) being purchased, but not
the very same electrons as delivered to it by the energy provider. Telecommunications
transport-particularly over longer distances-typically involves some form of multiplexing
in which individual signals are commingled for long-haul transport, much as individual
packages are combined in the same truck, railroad car, or airplane so as to achieve
comparable transport efficiencies. Prior to delivery, the signals are "demultiplexed" and
delivered to their recipient in essentially the same form as had been handed off by the sender
to the carrier. See ANNABEL Z. DODD, THE EssENTIAL GUIDE To TELECOMMUNICATIONS 23-
25 (2d ed. 2000).
43. Computer Inquiry II, supra note 8, at para. 5.
102 Vol. 63
Number 1] BROADBAND INTERNETACCESS10
premises equipment,"4 which as a result, emerged as a multi-billion dollar
competitive and highly innovative industry. Prior to the several FCC
decisions that permitted providers of last-mile broadband facilities to
foreclose competitors' use of those facilities for Internet access 45 the
independent information services industry had grown to a $23 billion
segment of the national economy.4
Not long after the Computer HI rules went into effect, the U.S.
Department of Justice entered into a settlement with AT&T and its
affiliates (collectively, the Bell System) with the intention of ending a
protracted antitrust action in which the DOJ had "alleged monopolization
by the defendants with respect to a broad variety of telecommunications
44. Id. at para. 141. Previously, telephone handsets and other customer premises
equipment (CPE) were "bundled" with basic local telephone service and could not be
purchased separately, or, if obtained from a source other than the local telephone company,
attached to the telephone company's facilities. In its seminal Carter/one rling, the FCC
allowed attachments of customer-owned CPE if achieved using a protective connecting
arrangement (PCA) that the customer was required to rent from the telephone company. Use
of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968). In 1977 and 1978, this PCA requirement was replaced by an equipment certification
program, permitting customers to directly connect "certified" CPE to the public telephone
network. Proposal for New or Revised Calsses [sic] of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll
Telephone Service (MTS) & Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), First Report and
Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), on reconsideration, 57 F.C.C.2d 1216 (1976), 58 F.C.C.2d
716 (1976), 59 F.C.C.2d 83 (1976); Proposal for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and
Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) & Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS),
Second Report and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976), on reconsideration, 61 F.C.C.2d 396
(1976), 64 F.C.C.2d 1058 (1977), affd sub nom. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC,
552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir., 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977). Shortly before its
Computer HI decision, the FCC ruled as unlawful the ILEC practice of requiring the
customer to use at least one telco-provided handset (the so-called "primary instrument"
concept). Implications of the Telephone Industry's Primary Instrument Concept, Report and
Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 1157 (1978). These policies culminated in Computer HI, in which the
FCC required ILECs to unbundle CPE from any basic telecommunications offering, to
remove it from their regulated operations and, in the case of the largest ILECs (the Bell and
GTE operating companies), to offer CPE only through a fully separate subsidiary. Computer
Inquiry 11, supra note 8, at paras. 150-158, 174. The Bell company CPE affiliates were
retained by AT&T followng the 1984 breakup of the former Bell System, effectively taking
the divested Bell operating companies out of the CPE business. See United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 192 (D.D.C. 1982).
45. See, e.g., Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978, para. 7 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial Review
Order or TAO], vacated and remanded in part, affirmed in part, United States Telecomm.
Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004) (high
frequency portion of the loop, hybrid fiber-coaxial loops, and "greenfield" loops); Cable
Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 15, para. 11I (cable broadband facilities for Internet
access); B WIA Order, supra note 24, para. 5 (ILEC broadband facilities for Internet access).
46. Corey Grice, Short Take: ISP Revenue Will Near $23 Billion, Study Says, CNET
(Feb. 15, 2000), http://news.cnet.com/Short-Take-ISP-revenue-will-near-23-biltion,-study-
says/21 10-1033_3-236944.htmld.
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services and equipment in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. ,47
After a Tunney Act proceeding, the U.S. District Court approved the
Consent Decree, with modifications the court deemed necessary to make
the settlement consistent with the public interest. The Consent Decree, as
modified (commonly referred to as the Modification of Final Judgment or
MFJ), incorporated a structural approach to delinking ILEC market power
in the last-mile (local access) from potentially competitive long distance
services.4 It also incorporated and reinforced the Computer 11 framework
by barring the Bell ILECs from the customer premises equipment
(manufacturing) and information services lines of business.4  Manfy of the
key structural protections in the ME] were incorporated into the 1996 Act,
which made provision for their phase-out once the FCC had determined
that competition had been firmly established with respect to local exchange
and exchange access services.5
With these structural protections in place, by the end of the 1 990s
numerous local and national ISPs had entered what by then had become an
extremely competitive and unconcentrated market. When demand for dial-
up Internet access had reached its peak, around the beginning of 2002, even
the largest ISP at that time-America Online-served only one in five
Internet-connected households."1 By contrast, between 1980 and the
passage of the 1996 Act, local telephone companies (telcos) showed little
interest in being enhanced service providers beyond pursuing efforts to
obtain their legal right to do so. 5 2 When, in the late 1990s, some ILECs
finally began offering enhanced services (renamed "information services"
under the 1996 Act),53 they were compelled under Computer Inquiry 1l/I1l
(and, in the case of the Bell ELECs, the MFJ provisions incorporated into
the 1996 Act) to afford their ISP affiliate no preference or advantage
relative to other nonaffiliated ISs.14
47. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 139 (D.D.C. 1982).
48. See id at 224.
49. Id at 189-91, 224.
50. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-72 (1996).
51. See Patricia Fusco, Top U.S. ISPs by Subscriber. QJ 2002, ISP-PLANET (May 13,
2002), http://www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usaql12002.htmnl (including AOL
(17.1% market share) and AOL-owned brands CompuServe and Road Runner (2.0% and
1.6% respectively) totaling 20.7% of the market share).
52. One of the "line of business restrictions" in the 1984 Consent Decree had precluded
Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC) entry into the "information services" business.
However, that restriction was lifted in 1991. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F.
Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991).
53. See infra note 55.
54. By 1999, telephone companies were selling approximately 28.9 million additional
residential lines (meaning that nearly thirty percent of households with a telephone were
purchasing an additional line). IN.DUSTRY ANALYSIS DIVISION, COMMON CARRIER BUREAU,
FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 8-6 tbl. 8.4 (Dec. 2000),
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At that time, the ILECs' principal Internet focus was directed more
toward selling highly profitable second residential telephone lines"5 (so that
the customer's primary line remained available for voice communications
when a dial-up online service was being accessed) than upon offering
information services. Although by 1990, U.S. ILECs possessed technology
necessary to provide customers with a dedicated data channel on the same
copper loop as the customer' s voice service,5 the ILECs had little incentive
to actively market these services, since it would undercut the lucrative
market for second residential lines.5" This all changed when the large
ILECs began to experience competition in the form of dedicated broadband
access services offered by cable companies. Confronted for the first time
http://fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State-Link/IAD/trend200.pdf. By
contrast, at the end of 1999, ILEfCs provided fewer than 300,000 high-speed (over 200 Kbps
in at least one direction) ADSL lines to residential and small business customers nationwide.
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIVISION, COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FCC, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR
INTERNET ACCESS: SUBSCRIBERSHIP AS OF JUNE 30, 2000, at 5 tbl. 3 (Oct. 2000),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_-Carrier/Reports/FCC-State LinkIIAD/hspd I 000.pdf.
55. In most areas, distribution cable capacity, including drop wires into individual
homes, was sufficient to provide a significant percentage of households with a second dial
tone access line with little or no capital investment and minimal additional operating costs.
As a result, incremental revenues derived from second residential access lines were in most
cases substantially in excess of incremental costs for these services. At its peak, the market
for additional residential lines being used for dial-up Internet access was generating as much
as $9 billion in annual revenue for the ILECs. (This calculation is performed using usage
and subscriber data found in AOL TIME WARNER INC., FORM 10-K: ANNUAL REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (Mar. 2002),
available at http://edgar.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/dataI 105705/000095013002001845/
dl0k405.htm; industry subscriber data from Jupiter Research; and the conservative
assumption that average non-AOL dial-up use was fifty percent of average AOL dial-up
use.).
56. Joseph Lechleider, a scientist at Bellcore, is credited with the development of
ADSL (Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line) in the late 1980s. ADSL is a technology that
allows users to download data at a faster rate than they uploaded it, thus mirroring the way
most users used the Internet-sending a small amount of information up to the provider
requesting a download of a significantly large quantity of data. This technology made its
first appearance on the marketplace in the form of ISDN (Integrated Services Digital
Network).
57. Raymond W. Smith, Bell Atlantic's then-CEO, told a group of securities analysts at
a March 1996 Merrill Lynch Telecommunications CEO Conference that the rate of
additional line growth in Bell Atlantic's operating territory had been increasing, and noted
that additional lines produce significant incremental revenue:
In 1995, sales of secondary lines at Bell Atlantic increased more than 50 percent,
fueled by surging demand for Internet and telecommuting applications. Unlike
traditional horizontal line growth, which would have significantly added to our
capital expenditures, the vertical growth we experienced in '95 brought most of
the revenues down to the bottom line. That's because we were able to provision
new lines and services from idle capacity in an existing plant.
Raymond W. Smith, Creating Shareowner Value in a Converged, Post-Legislation
Environment, Speech at the Merrill Lynch Telecommunications CEO Conference (Mar. 19,
1996) (emphasis added), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=
2074680011.
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with a competitive threat to their lucrative second line business, ILECs
finally began to market their dedicated channel Internet access services.518
Then, when the FCC went so far as to exempt cable companies from the
obligation to provide the broadband transmission on a common carrier
basis, the IILECs saw an opportunity-by claiming "parity"-to prevent
competitors from gaining access to their own broadband facilities for
purposes of providing a competitive retail Internet access service. Under a
regulatory framework in which the last-mile broadband
telecommunications channel and Internet access were deemed inextricably
linked, the entry opportunities that had been previously available to non-
ILEC dial-up ISPs no longer existed with respect to broadband access. As
the demand for dial-up Internet access waned, most nonfacilities-based
ISPs-unable to migrate their mass market customers to their own
broadband Internet access services-were left to atrophy and eventually go
out of business.
C. Is Today's Broadband Internet Access an Information Service
or Simply Basic Transmission?
In seeking to justify the decision to treat broadband Internet access as
somehow different from previous transmission platforms for accessing
information services, those supporting complete deregulation of Internet
access (including the elimination of the Computer IMl framework as to
these services) have relied upon various artificial-and superficial-
distinctions that generally fall into one of two principal categories:
technology-based and economic-based. We begin by addressing the
technology-based distinctions, and explain why Internet access
appropriately belongs on the "basic" or "telecommunications" side of the
line. We then address the economic arguments-the purported existence of
broadband competition and the claimed need for deregulation to promote
investment.
58. In a comprehensive report on broadband industry status, released in October, 1999,
the Staff of the FCC's Cable Bureau stated:
The ILECs' aggressive deployment of DSL can be attributed in large part to the
deployment of cable modem service. Although the ILECs have possessed DSL
technology since the late 1980s, they did not offer the service, for concern that it
would negatively impact their other lines of businesses. The deployment of cable
modem service, however, spurred the ILECs to offer DSL or risk losing potential
subscribers to cable. In various communities where cable modem service becomes
available, the ILECs would soon deploy DSL service that was comparable in price
and performance to the cable modem offering. Thus, prior to cable modem
deployment, the ILECs had little incentive to deploy DSL and the consumer had
no choice for highspeed Internet access.
Staff Report to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, BROADBAND TODAY, 27 (Oct. 16,
1999), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf.
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111. TECHNOLOGY-BASED CLAIMS THAT BROADBAND INTERNET
ACCESS IS AN INFORMATION SERVICE
As discussed in the previous section, the FCC's broadband
classification orders repeatedly refer back to the 1998 Stevens Report to
support its characterization of Internet access services as involving
"bundled" transmission and information services. The FCC has also relied
upon analysis in the Stevens Report to conclude that Domain Name
Services (DNS), an integral component of all forms of Internet access, is an
information service. It is questionable whether either of these two
conclusions was correct when they were adopted back in 1998 (or relied
upon in 2002 and 2005), but they are certainly not correct as to the Internet
and Internet services as these have come to exist today, in 2010 and
beyond.
A. "Bundled" Information Services
In the earliest days of so-called "online" information services-such
as CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online, and even specialized online
services such as Lexis/Nexis and the online reservation systems that were
operated by several airlines and made available to travel agents and
others-the information accessed was physically located on host computers
belonging to entities known at the time as "enhanced service providers"
(ESPs).5 9 The subscriber sent data to the service provider, whose computers
acted upon that data and sent information back to the subscriber .60 As these
services developed, service providers were able to offer end users more
applications and content by adding information products developed by third
parties, some of which did not reside on the service provider's own
platform. Nonetheless, both the selection and the management of these
third party applications or content sources continued to be within the
control of the ISP.
59. The ternm "enhanced service provider" originated in the FCC's Computer Inquiry 1,
and was used to generically describe pre-Intemet online service providers in the 1980s, such
as Telenet, Tymnet, and Electronic Data Systems (EDS), and subsequently providers such
as CompuServe and Prodigy. See, e.g., ADAPSO, the Computer Software and Services
Industry Association, Inc., et al., Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 12128, para. 1 (1995). In the 1996 Act,
the term "information services" was substituted for such "enhanced services." See
Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 & 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11I F.C.C.R. 21905, para. 103 (1996). While the acronym "ISP"
today is generally used to denote Internet Service Providers, at the time the FCC was
implementing the 1996 Act, the term "ISP" was understood to refer to the broader category
of "Information Service Providers." See, e.g., Access Charge Reform, First Report and
Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15982, para. 50 (1997); Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance
Review for Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Third Report and
Order, and Notice of Inquiry, 11 F.C.C.R. 21354, para. 313 (1996).
60. See generally Computer Inquiry IH, supra note 8, at para. 97.
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With the development of the public Internet, the role of the ISP has
fuindamentally changed. Whereas in 1996 and into the early 2000s, the
prevailing model for ISPs was to maintain and provide applications and
content on their own computing platforms, ISPs today (and especially
providers that offer Internet access over their own local distribution
facilities) act primarily, if not exclusively, as conduits, forwarding and
transmitting their subscribers' data to or from one or more Internet
gateways or "peering points" from which the data is routed to or from a
website or other Internet location designated by the end user. Even if the
ISP also offers its own proprietary "information services," it typically uses
the public Internet for providing access to such proprietary content or
applications.6
The nature of Internet services has also changed from the customer's
perspective. Whereas with legacy information services, the customer
interacted by default with the ISP's e-mail or web-browsing platforms, that
customer is now required to affirmatively choose between content and
applications offered by his ISP or the equivalent (and often preferred)
services that are available from independent providers. This is true
regardless of whether the ISP owns the underlying broadband transmission.
For example, users are electing increasingly to utilize ISP-independent
sources of e-mail services. 62 While most ISPs offer their subscribers
content-rich home pages as "portals" to news, sports, weather, financial
data, entertainment, shopping, and other services, these same types of
content and services are also available from any number of non-ISP portals,
including both general purpose portals like yahoo.com and google.com,
and specialized or special interest portals, such as those maintained by local
61. AOL is a rare exception to this model in that it maintains several proprietary data
centers through which its subscribers gain access to various information and content on
AOL's own platform or are sent on to any Internet site. See Am. Online v. Pennsylvania,
932 A.2d 332, 334 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007), affd, 963 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2008).
62. There are significant advantages to customers electing this form of e-mail, because
it allows them to change ISPs without also having to change their e-mail addresses.
Google's "Gmail" is an increasingly popular source of "free" e-mail, as are any number of
other such services available either "free" or at relatively little cost. The top four non-
facilities-based providers of "free" e-mail-Yahoo, Hotmail, Google, and AOL-had some
226 million unique visitors in July 2009. By comparison, the top four facilities-based
broadband Internet access providers--Comcast, AT&T, Verizon, and TimeWarner
Roadrnmner-accounted for only about 17 million unique visitors during that same month.
Yahoo Mail Still King as Gmail Lurks, CNET NEWS (Aug. 17, 2009, 10:53 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-10311150-265.html. Some universities, for example,
offer their alumni "lifetime" e-mail addresses that stay with the individual irrespective of the
choice of ISP at any point in time. See, e.g., GW Alumni Email Services, GW ALumNI,
http://www.alumni.gwu.edu/benefits/emait/index.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010)
(providing GW alumni free email for life: yourname~gwmail.gwu.edu). The Google search
"alumni email" yields more than a hundred examples of similar alumni email offers.
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newspapers, TV networks, and other organizations .6 1 Conversely, ISP-
owned portals (such as Comcast.net and Verizon.net) are no longer
maintained on a purely proprietary basis for the benefit of the ISPs' own
subscribers; rather, they can be accessed by anyone via the public
Internet.64
Given the ease with which standard Internet browsers enable users to
select their "home" page, only the least sophisticated of Internet users are
likely to retain the default setting directing them to their Internet access
provider's default home page. Moreover, should the customer elect to
access the provider's website or e-mail services, the routing to such
services will be via the public Internet in much the same manner as for
most other Internet-based applications and content. Thus, while nominally
"included" within the "bundle" of services that constitute broadband
wireline Internet access, the actual use of these "bundled" information
services is diminishing to the point of near extinction. Whatever technical
linkage the FCC had earlier identified as between the broadband
telecommunications and information services components of the "bundle,"
such linkage certainly does not exist today, if indeed it ever did. At bottom,
today's broadband Internet access service-whether provided via I1LEC,
cable, or wireless facilities-is telecommunications, nothing more.
Wireless carriers have attempted to engineer a somewhat tighter
linkage between their wireless Internet access and the content and
applications that they are also offering in conjunction with these services.
Unlike a wireline Internet connection where users typically access
bandwidth using their own device and software (e.g., a PC or a Macintosh,
any of several operating systems, a web browser, and any number of
specialized web-based applications), wireless carriers in the United States
sell only carrier-approved handsets with carrier-limited software.6 5
63. See, e.g., GoOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); YAHOO!,
http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); CNN, http://cnn.com (last visited Nov.
16, 2010); THE NEW YoRK TIMEs, http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
64. See, e.g., COMCAST.NET, http://www.comcast.net (last visited Nov. 16, 2010);
VERIZON CENTRAL, http://www.verizon.net (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). For example,
AT&T's portal, www.att.net, is actually run by Yahoo! and is substantively identical to the
publicly available www.yahoo.COM. AT&T, http://www.att.net (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
The att.net domain name resolves to http://att.my.yahoo.coml, and the contents of the site
are available to any user, linking to regularly available yahoo.com content. See AT&T,
http://att.my.yahoo.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); YAHOO!, www. yahoo.com (last visited
Nov. 16, 2010).
65. In its initial rules for cellular systems, the FCC had required full compatibility
among all wireless services and handsets. An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845
MHz and 870-890 MHz for Cellular Communications Systems, Report and Order, 86
F.C.C.2d 469, paras. 84-95 (1981). In 1988, the FCC relaxed this requirement, allowing
carriers individually to specify handset properties and protocols for use on their respective
networks. Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission's Rules to Permit Liberalization
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In the case of traditional handsets (i.e., not the so-called
"smartphones"), consumers are often limited to browsing the web through a
carrier-designed browser that imposes severe limits upon the form of the
web content that can be viewed. 6 The consumer can purchase a limited
array of add-on features such as ringtones, "themes," and games, but only
through a carrier-operated portal.6 There is no technical basis for any of
these limitations; the underlying wireless data network, like the wireline
Internet, is totally agnostic as to the type of content being carried and the
application that receives the data at either end.6
The introduction of "srnartphones" further demonstrates that wireless
data networks have the technical capability to communicate with most
ordinary HTML websites via a traditional (non-carrier) web browser, to
download photos, videos, and other content directly from the web rather
than only through a carrier-sponsored portal, and to run applications
authored by sources other than the carrier and handset manufacturers.
However, wireless carriers have continued to limit the available uses of the
underlying data stream running to and from their customers' smartphones.
For example, Apple and AT&T entered into an exclusive arrangement
whereby Apple's iWhone would be available in the United States only for
use on the AT&T network, and Apple limits the applications offered to
of Technology and Auxiliary Service Offerings in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio
Telecommunications Service. Report and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 7033, paras. 41-43 (1988).
Although consumers may still obtain carrier-approved wireless handsets from sources other
than the carrier itself, the vast majority of wireless handsets sold in the United States are
carrier-branded, i.e., are provided either directly through a carrier-owned retail outlet or
through a carrier-authorized agent or reseller. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Fourteenth Report, 2010 FCC LEXIS 3186,
paras. 239-41 (2010) [hereinafter CARS Competition Fourteenth Report]. In either case, the
carrier assumes the role of gatekeeper with respect to handset fuinctionality.
66. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947, para. 98 (2006).
67. For example, AT&T provides wireless access to the Internet via various
applications embedded in the basic phone software. Users browse the web using the AT&T
Mobility "MEdia Net" browser, shop for ringtones using the "AppCenter," and can watch
videos and listen to music using the AT&T CVfMobile Video software. See, e.g., AT&T
APPCENTER, https:H/appcenter.wireless.att.com/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); AT&T MEDIA
NET, http://www.wireless.att.com/leam/messaging-intemnet/media-entertainment/media-
net.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
68. For example, AT&T offers data plans that allow users to connect laptops and other
computers to the same data network that 3G phones use. AT&T GET STARTED,
http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/cell-phone-plans/data-connect-plans.jsp
(last visited Nov. 16, 20 10). AT&T also offers data plans for phones that include "tethering"
functionality that allows users to connect to the internet on their computers using the data
connection provided by the users' "tethered" phone. AT&T's standard terms describe all of
its available data plans, including those with "tethering." AT&T WIRELESS CUSTOMER
AGREEMENT, http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/legal/plan-terms.jsp (last
visited Nov. 16, 2010).
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iPhone users by requiring that all be purchased solely through its
proprietary "App Store."69 Some of the restrictions on the App Store are
clearly set by Apple, but others (such as limitations on third party VOWT
access to the 3G data stream) are likely carrier-imposed. 0 These
restrictions are also artificial: When hackers have utilized a process known
as "jailbreaking" to remove the Apple/AT&T restrictions on available
applications, the user is able to gain unfettered access to the basic TCP/TP
stream of the underlying wireless data network .7 ' But for these carrier-
contrived, mechanical restrictions, there is no inherent difference between
wireline and wireless Internet access--both require nothing more than the
establishment of a telecommunications connection between users or
between a user and a host content or application provider. Whatever
artificial linkage may be created between wireless Internet access and
certain "information services" does not alter the fundamental
telecommunications character of the wireless Internet access service.
B. Domain Name Services
In the B WIA Order, the FCC makes a finding that Domain Name
Services (DNS) provide the end user with "more than transparent
transmission .... *,7 That assessment is wrong. DNS is purely and simply a
routing database that translates a web domain name (e.g.,
www.anything.com) into an IP address (e.g., 123.234.345,456).~ A master
DNS database is maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority,
operated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), and is replicated at multiple locations throughout the global
Internet.74 Individual access providers typically maintain their own DNS,
69. The trade press is rife with discussions of AT&T and Apple's exclusive iPhone
agreement, with debate only over just how long AT&T will retain this exclusive
arrangement. See, e.g., Report. iphone Exclusive to AT&T Until 2012, FIERCEWIRELESS
(May 11, 2010, 9:42 AM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/report-t-apple-originally-
locked-down-iphone-until-2012/2010-05-1 1; see also IPHONE APP STORE,
http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/app-store.html (last visited Nov. 16, 20 10).
70. See CAMS Competition Fourteenth Report, supra note 66, at para. 152.
71. Numerous websites offer software and instructions on how to "jailbreak" an iPhone,
and the myriad benefits of doing so. One prominent jailbreak website,
www.jailbreakme.com, details that jailbreaking "is simply the ability to run apps and use
themes and tweaks not approved by Apple." JAILBREAKME 2.0 'STAR',
http://www.jailbreakme.com/faq.html (last visited Nov. 16, 20 10).
72. BWIA Order, supra note 24, at para. 15. As explained earlier, the analysis
underlying this conclusion dates back to the Stevens Report on universal service matters. See
supra Part II.A.
73. See DNS, ToPBITS.com, http://www.tech-faq.com/what-is-dns.html (last visited
Nov. 16, 20 10).
74. Introducing JANA, INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AuTHORITY,
http://www.iana.org/about (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
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updating it continuously as new or changed domain name registrations are
propagated across the Internet by ICANN and certified domain name
registrars."5
The routing function supported by the DNS is completely analogous
to various other database-driven routing schemes that have been in use
within the public switched telephone network (PSTN) for decades.
800 Database. The most well-known of these routing systems is the
so-called "800 Database," adopted by the FCC in 1989 as a means for de-
linking customers' 800 or other toll-free numbers from specific
interexchange carriers.7 Previously, customers could not switch carriers
without also changing their 800-number, thereby undermining competitive
opportunities in the toll-free services market.77 When a caller dials a toll-
free 800-type telephone number, the originating local exchange carrier
(LEC) performs a "dip" into the 800 Database for the purpose of
identifyin the interexchange carrier (IXC) selected by the toll-free service
customer. The call is then routed by the originating LEG to the selected
IXC, which performs a second "dip" into its own proprietary database for
the purpose of translating the dialed toll-free number into a network routing
address to the toll-free service customer .79 Some toll-free service providers
also offer so-called "enhanced 800 services" (not to be confused with
"enhanced" as the term is used in the Computer II basic/enhanced services
distinction80) supporting d4'namic or variable rather than simple fixed
routing of the toll-free call .8y
75. ICANN-Accredited Registrars, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/
accredited-list.htmli (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
76. See Provision of Access for 800 Service, Report and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2824
(1989); see also Toll Free Service Access Codes, Fifth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
11939, paras. 4-9 (2000) (describing the history of the 800 database and carrier-independent
number administration).
77. The "800 Database" is maintained by a neutral third-party database administrator
and by individual toll-free service providers. Toll Free Service Access Codes, 15 F.C.C.R.
11939, at paras. 2-3.
78. See, e.g., Qwest Corp. Tariff FCC No. 1, §§ 6.2.8, 6.2.9 (Aug. 8, 2007) (interstate
access charges).
79. Id. The network routing address may be an ordinary ten-digit "Plain Old Telephone
Service" (POTS) telephone number or a dedicated "special access" type connection to the
toll-free service customer.
80. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
81. See Qwest Corp. Tariff FCC No. 1, supra note 78. For example, an inbound 800-
type call might be routed to any of several different "call centers" maintained by the toll-
free service customer based upon time of day and/or traffic conditions at each location. In
another application, the routing might be based upon the geographic location of the caller-
for example, routing the call to the toll-free customer's retail location closest to the caller.
The term "enhanced" here reflects the common usage of the word, i.e., "augmented." See
Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corporations for Transfer of
Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 18025, para. 26 (1998) ("[L]arger
business users often demand advanced long distance features (advanced features), such as
frame relay, virtual private networks (VPN), and enhanced 800 services (E800 services).").
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Local Number Portability (LNP). Paralleling its "800 Number
Portability" ruling, the FCC in 1996 ordered that wireline LECs must offer
customers the ability to retain their previously assigned telephone number
when switching local carriers' 82 "Local Number Portability" ("LNP") was
implemented in 1999,83 and the requirement was subsequently extended to
wireless carriers as well.84 In some cases, customers may also "port" their
existing telephone number even when switching between a wireline and a
wireless phone .85 Now, in order to route a call to its intended recipient, the
"4next-to-last" carrier must first check the dialed number against an LNP
database to determine whether it has been ported to another carrier and, if it
has, to retrieve the carrier and routing information needed to complete the
call. 6
Modem stored program controlled (SPC) digital central office
switches and networks utilize a variety of routing data bases to associate
logical network "addresses" with physical network elements. Digital
electronic local telephone central office switches, such as the
AT&T/Lucent Technologies No. 5 ESS, employ locally maintained
intraswitch databases to translate the dialed telephone number into a
hardware "switch port" address associated with the called party's access
line."7
0 Since the introduction of stored program control electronic switching
in the 1 970s, local telephone companies have offered "speed calling"
services that permit the customer to maintain a small private database (list)
of stored telephone numbers resident in the computer that controls the local
The tariffing of these services (as required by 47 U.S.C. § 203) is consistent with their
classification as "basic" telecommunications services, subject to Title 11 regulation.
82. Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 11I F.C.C.R. 8352 (1996). Although the FCC initiated this
proceeding in 1995, by the time it issued its First Report and Order, the 1996 Act codified
the requirement for all LE~s to provide local number portability in the manner specified by
the FCC. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 10 1 (a), 1 10 Stat. 56
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 25 1(b)(2)).
83. See Long-Term Number Portability Tariff Filings, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 11883 (1999).
84. Telephone Number Portability-Carrier Requests for Clarification of Wireless-
Wireless Porting issues, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 20971, para. 15
(2003).
85. See Telephone Number Portability CTIA Petitions for Declaratory Ruling on
Wireline-Wireless Porting Issues, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 23697, para. 1 (2003).
86. See Telephone Number Portability, Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Reconsideration and Order on Application for Review, 17 F.C.C.R. 2578, para. 5 n.12
(2002).
87. See Jerry W. Johnson et a]., No. 5 ESS-Serving the Present, Serving the Future, 59
BELL LAB. REc., 290, 290-293 (1981). See generally AT&T BELL TELEPHONE
LABORATORIES, ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS IN THE BELL SYSTEM 507-513 (2d ed. 1984).
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central office switch, and to use one- or two-digit "abbreviated dialing" to
access specific numbers in the customer's speed call list, which the
computer will then translate into the full domestic or international
telephone number. 88
In each of these cases, the database and translation functions arguably
involve "computer processing applications that act on the format, content,
code, protocol or. similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted
information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured
information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information
In any event, these functions are entirely analogous to the database and
translation functions performed by DNS, yet each of these PSTN database
services are unambiguously "basic" Title 11 services. Nowhere has the FCC
offered or attempted to offer any explanation as to how the routing
functions supported by DNS differ in any substantive manner from the
comparable routing functions supported by the various PSTN databases.
This is hardly surprising, because the functions involved are essentially the
same. There are, in fact, no specific, identifiable attributes of DNS that
would 'cause this particular routing function to be classified as an
"information service" whereas the comparable PSTN routing activities are
treated as basic.
C Technology Transitions Are an Ongoing Part of
Telecommunications Industry Progress
Other arguments in favor of treating Internet access as an information
service rely upon the fact that various ''translations'' or "conversions"~ are
required for Internet Protocol (1P) transmissions to coexist with
transmissions via the circuit-switched PSTN. The FCC expected that its
basic/enhanced distinction to be sufficiently robust to adapt "[a]s the
market applications of computer technology increase," and it recognized
that "[t]ransmission networks have benefitted [sic] from some of the
productive breakthroughs which this relatively new field has made
possible."90 In fact, the FCC expressed confidence that its basic/enhanced
distinction would "allow[] the provider of these basic services to integrate
technological advances conducive to the more efficient transmission of
information through the network without the threat of a sudden,
fundamental change in the regulatory treatment of that service or firm."9' In
88. ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS TN THE BELL SYSm, supra note 87, at 58; see also
Bell Communications Research, Features Common to Residence and Business Customers
III, LATA Switching Sys. Generic Requirements, July 1987, at 1-3.
89. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1999).
90. Computer Inquiry II, supra note 8, at para. 100.
9 1. Id. at para. 10 1.
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a 1983 ruling intended to clarify the Computer Inquiry II framework, the
FCC specifically recognized that this framework must be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate an evolutionary transition to new transport
technology, and that under such conditions, the use of certain format, code,
or protocol conversions (to permit communication between the legacy and
the new technology) would not in and of itself transform a "basic" into an
66 92
"enhanced" service.
Over time, there have been numerous examples of service
arrangements involving such "passive" conversions that do not alter their
"basic" character:
* Analog-to-digital conversion for transmission of voice or digital
information on the public switched telephone network93 (e.g., to
permit transmissions to be passed between an electromechanical or
analog electronic space-division central office switch and a time-
division multiplexed digital switch, or from an analog voice
wireline handset to a digital voice wireless handset;
* Analog-to-digital wireless conversions occurring on wireless
networks and conversions required to permit traffic to be
exchanged between wireless digital protocols (e.g., TDMA,
CDMA, GSM);94 and
* Utilization of computer processing to retrieve routing information
from a database, as with the 800 Database and Local Number
Portability databases.
The use of Internet Protocol to facilitate the transmission or routing of
voice and data is consistent with these precedents and should be viewed in
this same evolutionary context.
92. See Communications Protocols Under Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations, Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Statement of Principles, 95 F.C.C.2d
584, para. 28 (1983) [hereinafter Communications Protocols] ("Clarification is warranted
that protocol processing involved in the initiation, routing and termination of calls (or
subelements of calls, e.g., packets) is inherent in switched transmission [sic] and is not
within the definition of enhanced service, and we have done so herein. . .. Such protocol
processing or conversion may be associated either with basic or enhanced service without
affecting the classification of such service under Section 64.702(a) of our rules.") (citation
omitted).
93. See Amendment to Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Third Computer inquiry), Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987) (citing
Communications Protocols, supra note 92, at para. 16).
94. See generally Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio
Service Providers, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22
F.C.C.R. 15817 (2007) (concluding that automatic roaming is a common carrier obligation).
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D. Neither Its Eventual Destination (on the Public Internet) nor Its
Bandwidth (Speed) Set Broadband Internet Access Apart from Other
Last-Mile Telecommunications Services
Inasmuch as the functionality being provided by broadband Internet
access is telecommunications, is there some other unique quality that
justifies treating dedicated access to the Internet above a specified data
speed differently from other access? Over the past decade, the owners of
last-mile facilities have sought preferential treatment for broadband
Internet access relative to other telecommunications services, but there is
no technological or economic basis for such a distinction.
Although few would dispute the revolutionary and global impact that
the Internet has had upon almost every aspect of human life and society, in
terms of telecommunications technology, the IP network-particularly in
the access segment-is far more evolutionary than revolutionary. 95 Despite
advances in technology in transmission media (e.g., copper loop to coaxial
cable or fiber), switching (manual to electromechanical to digital), and
carrier systems (direct current to frequency-division multiplexing (FDM),
then to time-division multiplexing (TDM), and then packet-based systems
such as Frame Relay, MPLS, and Ethernet), the access function within
telecommunications networks remains largely unchanged. In particular,
with respect to the last-mile facilities that establish the end user's
connection to the larger network (whether the PSTN or the Internet), there
is no meaningful technological distinction between the dedicated facilities
that provide access to the Internet and other, earlier versions of local
access. Whatever occurs on the Internet is unaffected by whether a user
relies upon copper, coaxial cable, fiber, wireless, or any other transmission
medium to connect to the Internet from home. In addition, and perhaps
most important, as explained below, the economic principles that make it
impossible for new entrants to duplicate the incumbent providers' last-mile
95. The predecessor to what ultimately became known as the Internet was conceived
and implemented over the course of the 1 960s as a research project within the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the U.S. Department of Defense and was known as
ARPANET. The core Internet protocols that we use today (TCP/IP) were described in a
1974 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) paper. Vinton G. Cerf &
Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication, 22 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637 (May 1974). The early Internet was confined mainly to
government, research, and educational uses, but beginning in the early 1 990s was expanded
to include commercial uses and noncommercial users. In its original form as a proprietary,
private network, there was no need to classify the ARPANET or any of its segments for
regulatory purposes, but this changed with public access to the Internet and its now wildly
successful commercialization. For a brief overview of the history of the Internet, from
ARtPA through the formation of the public Internet, see Barbara Esbin, FCC, Internet over
Cable: Defining the Future in Terms of the Past, 6-13 (Office of Plans & Pol'y, Staff
Working Paper No. 30, 1998), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/workingpapers/
oppwp30.pdf.
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facilities are in no sense made inoperative merely because the underlying
transmission path provides more bandwidth than "traditional"
telecommunications facilities.
The policy set out at section 706 of the 1996 Act ("Advanced
Telecommunications Incentives") does not alter this conclusion.9 Section
706 establishes a policy under which the FCC and individual states, in their
capacity as regulators of telecommunications services,97 are to
encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans (including,
in particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms) by
utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest, convenience,
and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures
that promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or
other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment. 98
Beyond supporting "encouragement" of the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability,99 section 706 does nothing whatsoever to
amend or adapt the overall Title 11 framework. In particular, all of the
regulatory mechanisms proposed to be used for promoting advanced
telecommunications services arise under the FCC's powers as the regulator
of common carrier telecommunications (Title 11) services. The section also
suggests that in working toward this end, the objectives of promoting
investment, of promoting the public interest, and of promoting local
competition are all complementary, not competing goals. Ultimately, the
assessments that the FCC needs to make in order to implement section 706
are very similar to what it must consider under other competition and
forbearance provisions in the 1996 Act.'00
To gain forbearance and the elimination of any obligation to provide
last-mile broadband transmission to rival nonintegrated ISPs and to
downstream application and content providers, the ILECs advanced two
patently inconsistent claims. On the one hand, they contended that the
96. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157).
97. See id at § 706(a). One might question the basis for the FCC's reliance on section
706 in connection with broadband Internet access if that service is not
"telecommunications," or why the various tools the FCC is encouraged to use to promote
"advanced telecommunications capability," such as price cap regulation and forbearance,
arise under the FCC's Title 11 powers. Id. at § 706(c)(1).
98. Id. at § 706(a).
99. Id. at § 706(c)(1). Under this section, "advanced telecommunications capability" is
defined "without regard to any transmission medium or technology, as high-speed,
switched, broadband telecommunications capability..."Id.
100. For example, see section 401 (forbearance) and section 271 (Bell Operating
Company authorization for provision of long distance service)-each require the FCC to
find that the requested relief is pro-competitive and in the public interest. Id. at § § 401, 27 1.
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broadband market is intensely competitive, such that continuing regulation
and unbundling requirements are no longer necessary to protect
consumers.' 0 ' But at the same time, the ILECs also contended that further
broadband investment on their part would be unsupportable without the
deregulation they demanded, and warned that without those ELEC
broadband investments, ubiquitous broadband deployment would never
take place and the U.S. would fall into a broadband backwater vis-a-vis
other countries.10 2 Ironically, if the broadband market is as competitive as
the ILECs contend, then how is it that absent their involvement no other
provider can be expected to jump in and fill the gap? The FCC never seems
to have focused upon or addressed that rather obvious inconsistency.
In the end, of course, the FCC gave the ILECs what they wanted.'0 3
The ILECs, however, still made no broadband investments anywhere other
than those locations where they would have invested regardless of
regulation-either because it was economically attractive (e.g., in high
density areas) or because they needed to respond to the only other actual
competitor (the local cable company). Broadband deployment in rural and
in smaller urban areas has lagged.' Verizon has divested much of its
footprint in these areas, 05 and most recently the company announced that it
would discontinue further investment in its FiOS platform after the end of
2010.106 AT&T's investment in mass market broadband has been confined
to extremely modest upgrades to its existing infrastructure to support its U-
verse offering, a decidedly inferior broadband service when compared with
FiOS and with the current cable broadband state of the art. '0 7
101. See, e.g., Comments of Verizon Wireless at 7-10, Review of Regulatory
Requirements for ILEC Broadband Telecommunications Services, FCC CC Docket No. 01-
337 (rel. March 1, 2002), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
view.action?id=6513079790.
102. See id. at 14.
103. See BWIA Order, supra note 24.
104. See, e.g., FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 20, 37,
136 (2010) [hereinafter NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN]; Press Release, FCC, FCC Sends
National Broadband Plan to Congress (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296880Al.pdf.
105. See, e.g., VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., QUARTERLY REPORT (FORM 10-Q) (May
9, 2005); Press Release, Verizon Communications Inc., Verizon Completes Spin-Off of
Local Exchange and Related Businesses in Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont (Mar. 31,
2008); Press Release, Verizon Communications Inc., Verizon Completes Spinoff of Local
Exchange Businesses and Related Landline Activities in 14 States (Jul. 1, 2010).
106. See Robert Cheng, Verizon to End Rollout of FiOS, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/NAWSJPUB:SB10001424052702303410404575151773432
729614.html.
107. For example, there are five tiers of U-verse download speeds available: 3, 6, 12, 18,
and 24 Mbps. AT&T U-verse High Speed Internet, AT&T, http://www.att.com/u-
verse/explore/intemet-landing.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). Verizon offers FiOS at 15,
25, and 50 Mbps. FiOS Internet, VERIZON, http://www22.verizon.com/residentiall
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E. Regulating the Underlying Transmission in Internet Access
Services is Not, and Would Not Amount to or Result in, the
Regulation of Content or Application Providers
Those that have spoken most vociferously against net neutrality have
characterized these principles as requiring "regulation of the entire
Internet."' 0 8  Decades of effective separation of basic transmission
(regulated) from "enhanced" services and customer premises equipment
(unregulated) under the Computer Inquiry 11 framework show that this
conclusion completely misses the mark. Under that framework, the FCC
successfully deregulated all of the customer premises equipment and
enhanced services offered by ILECs and ensured that there was no need for
fiosinternet/#plans (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). Comcast also offers plans ranging up to 50
Mbps. High-Speed Internet: Speed Comparison, COMCAST, http://www.comcast.com/
CorporatelLearnlHighSpeedlntemetlspeedcomparison.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
Even Qwest, using an F'TTN technology similar to AT&T's, offers a 40 Mbps service.
Compare Qwest High-Speed Internet Plans, QWESr, http://www.qwest.comlresidentialV
internet/broadbandlanding/compare~plans.html (last visited Nov. 16, 20 10).
108. For example, after Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) introduced H.R. 5273, "A Bill
[(10 promote open broadband networks and innovation, foster electronic commerce, and
safeguard consumer access to online content and services," known by the short name, The
Net Neutrality Act of 2006, large telephone companies, as sponsors of an organization that
went by the name "Hands Off the Internet," took out a full page advertisement in the
Washington Post depicting the eleven-page bill as thousands of pages long. Net Neutrality
Act of 2006, H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. (2006); see Hands off the Internet, COMMON CAUSE,
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNKI MQIwG&b=2007803 (last visited
Nov. 16, 2010) (discussing the "Hands Off the Internet" advertisement in the Washington
Post). More recently, in comments filed in the FCC proceeding Framework for Broadband
Internet Service, AT&T asserted that "[ilf DNS look-up or security features were
insufficient to maintain a Title I information-service classification for broadband Internet
access providers even when those features are integrated with transmission functionality,
there would be no limiting principle that would prevent Title 11 regulation from
encompassing much of the rest of the Internet ecosystem." Comments of AT&T Inc. at 89,
Framework for Broadband Internet Service, FCC GN Docket No. 10-127 (rel. July 15,
20 10). In the same proceeding, Verizon claimed that
Any theory under which the Commission concluded that broadband Internet
access services included the offering of separate telecommunications service
under Title II would implicate all of these players [referring to a broad range of
content and application providers]. And the Commission's plan to then assert Title
I ancillary authority over the information service components of broadband
Internet access in order to promulgate 'net neutrality' rules would allow it to
sweep even more broadly and regulate other content, applications, and
information services delivered over the Internet.
Reply Comments of Verizon and Verizon Wireless at 62, Framework for Broadband
Internet Service, FCC GN Docket No. 10-127 (July 15, 2010). And, in a similar vein, the
National Cable & Telecommunications Association warned that "[olpening the door to the
common carrier regulation of 'connectivity' will quickly reach these information services'
fuinctionalities or other elements of the 'Internet ecosystem,' notwithstanding the
Commission's stated intent to snare in its net only broadband Internet access providers."
Comments of Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n at 55, Framework for Broadband Internet
Service, FCC GN Docket No. 10- 127 (July 15, 2010).
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any form of common carrier regulation to extend to non-ILEC providers of
these services.' 09
It is also clear that the Computer Inquiry HI framework is not confined
to a single technological vintage. Neither the speed of transmission, the
format of the information being transmitted, nor the switching technology
used to route the information make broadband access any different from
earlier basic transmission services. Even today, the transmission
component for dial-up Internet access continues to be a regulated common
carrier service that end users can use to reach independent ISPs that
connect the user to the (unregulated) Internet. If Internet access over dial-
up facilities can exist without regulation of the Internet, it is hard to see
why "Internet regulation" is the logical result of treating dedicated access
as a Title 11 service. Applying these same principles, it is clear that no
regulation of content- or application-related activity occurring on the
Internet need result from regulating Internet access as a Title 11 common
carrier telecommunications service.
IV. ECONOMIC REALITIES REQUIRE REGULATORY SUPPORT FOR
NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS BY COMPETITORS TO
BROADBAND TRANSMISSION USED FOR INTERNET ACCESS
In the previous section, we discussed why the model adopted by the
FCC to promote a competitive information services market-requiring that
the underlying transmission be offered on a nondiscriminatory, common
carrier basis-must also apply to broadband Internet access in the same
manner that it has with respect to "legacy" transmission services. Predictive
judgments and optimistic aspirations as to the development and growth of
facilities-based mass market broadband competition will not materialize if
the fundamental economics cannot support such entry-and if we have
learned nothing else over the fifteen years since adoption of the 1996 Act,
it is that such entry is not economically viable. But the lack of economic
feasibility of facilities-based competition does not mean that competition at
the retail level cannot take place and, indeed, Computer Inquiry HI and the
1996 Act contemplate-and are expressly aimed at facilitating-precisely
this form of entry.
So long as wireline Internet access remains a closed duopoly
controlled by the incumbent LEC and the incumbent cable company, the
FCC will need to step in as the "traffic cop" for ensuring nondiscriminatory
Internet access. If the FCC promotes access competition at the retail level
by mandating that nonfacilities-based ISPs be afforded nondiscriminatory
access to dominant facilities-based wireline and wireless distribution
10 Stevens Report, supra note 5, at para. 45; see also Computer Inquiry HI, supra note 8.
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infrastructures, then marketplace forces, and not regulatory oversight, will
ensure the development and growth of competition in all Internet segments
-access, content, and applications. Put differently, and contrary to the
claims of the dominant incumbents, reinstatement of full Computer Inquiry
HI safeguards with respect to broadband Internet access is a far more
effective and far less regulatory approach to assuring net neutrality and an
open Internet than ongoing administration of direct net neutrality
regulations.
In this section, we discuss the importance of competition for
broadband Internet access and how the FCC, using the tools provided in the
1996 Act and in its own Computer Inquiry II regulations, can ensure net
neutrality by promoting Internet access entry and competition by
nonfacilities-based providers.
A. Regardless of the Technology in the Upstream Network, Access
Facilities Remain a Bottleneck
While Computer Inquiry HI enabled competition to develop in markets
adjacent to telecommunications, another market structure mechanism was
largely responsible for enabling competition to develop for
telecommunications services that were dependent upon the local access
bottleneck. In 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Harold Greene approved the
Consent Decree that required the restructuring of the Bell System in a
manner intended to make the Bell operating companies provide access
services on a nondiscriminatory basis to all providers of long distance
service.' ' Prior to the 1984 structural separation of AT&T from its local
Bell exchange carriers, AT&T's long distance business received highly
preferential treatment from the local Bell operating companies (its
affili ates)-treatment that was simply not available to competing long
distance carriers. Customers of MCI, Sprint, and other long distance
entrants were forced to dial as many as twenty additional digits-rather
than the eleven digits that AT&T's customers were required to dial-in
order to place a long distance call."' Network interconnection
arrangements available to competing carriers were subject to a number of
technical limitations, and competitors had no access at all to important
signaling protocols. The denial of access to one of these capabilities,
known as "Answer Supervision," made it almost impossible for rival long
distance carriers to accurately time and bill their customers' calls;
110. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 220-22 (D.D.C.
1982).
111. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11I F.C.C.R. 15499, para. 17 (1996) [hereinafter First
Local Competition Order].
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unavoidable charges to customers for unanswered calls caused harm to
competitive carriers' business reputations and made it harder for them to
gain commercial acceptance. 112
Meaningful long distance competition did not become a reality until
the structural separation of the local and long distance businesses made the
local Bell companies indifferent as to their customers' choice of long
distance carrier, thereby eliminating any business purpose in their
maintaining these and other discriminatory practices. When the 1996 Act
provided a glide path for the divested Bell companies to reenter the long
distance market (upon satisfying certain requirements intended to facilitate
competition at the local service level without any requirement to
demonstrate that effective competition had actually developed for local
exchange services'), and the FCC went on to permit the Bell companies to
bundle their local and long distance services into a single flat-rate
package,'"4 stand-alone long distance competition all but disappeared.
The anticompetitive conditions that existed before the courts and the
FCC ensured equal access to local exchange services clearly demonstrate
that the potential for competitive foreclosure is neither theoretical nor far-
fetched."15 There is an unmistakable parallel between the long distance
market prior to the break-up of the former Bell System and the broadband
112. With respect to long distance services, these inequalities were largely addressed
through the FCC's equal access regime and the provisions in the MFJ. See GTE Sprint
Communications Corp., US Telecom, Inc., Alinet Communications Services, Inc., & U.S.
Transmission Systems, Inc., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1985 FCC LEXIS 2207, para.
63 (1985); see also Bill Correctors, Ltd. v. MCI Comm. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 1984 FCC LEXIS 1715, para. 4 (1984).
113. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B) (2006) ("Competitive Checklist").
114. It took until December 2003 for Bell operating companies to receive authority to
offer in-region long distance services in all of their operating states. Application of Qwest
Communications International Inc. for Authorization to Provide in-Region, InterLATA
Serv. in Ariz., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 25504, paras. 1-2 (2003). By
2005, when the FCC was reviewing the proposed Verizon-MCI merger, it noted "significant
evidence in the record that long distance service purchased on a stand-alone basis is
becoming a fringe market." Verizon Communications Inc. & MCI, Inc. Applications for
Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C. R. 18433,
para. 92 (2005).
115. In her recent article, Transporting Communications, Professor Susan Crawford
provides an excellent overview of how, throughout the history of telecommunications,
"companies providing general-purpose access services given sufficient legal discretion will
both discriminate against particular communications in favor of their own complementary
businesses and act on the content of messages they are asked to transmit, to their own
commercial advantage." Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L.
Rnv. 871, 876 (2009). While we do not disagree with Professor Crawford's conclusion that
structural separation of the common carrier's Internet access transmission offerings from its
competitive activities would be a highly effective means of preventing such discrimination,
id at 927-28, such an approach may not be practical to implement at the present time, due
to the legal and political hurdles it is likely to face.
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Internet access market as it exists today. Net neutrality is about a great
many things, but fuindamentally it should be viewed as key to preserving
and protecting competition in all non-last-mile adjacent network,
application, and content markets. When a last-mile broadband provider is
able to act as a gatekeeper for access to consumer "eyeballs,"" 6 it has the
very same ability to restrict or deny access to downstream application and
content providers as the local pre-1984 AT&T telephone operating
companies had with respect to downstream (non-AT&T) long distance
carriers. Absent effective competition for last-mile broadband (wireline or
wireless) Internet access, the last-mile broadband provider has both the
incentive and the ability to impose excessive fees for such access and/or to
force downstream application and content providers to direct their traffic to
the last-mile provider's own backbone network-threatening the continued
viability of backbone network providers that do not also have last-mile end
user customers of their own. Application and content providers unwilling
or unable to pay the required "tribute" could be cut off altogether from the
last-mile provider's end users, or otherwise be forced to accept a degraded
connection. The parallels between pre-Bell System break-up long distance
competition and the current potential for vertical market foreclosure arising
from the last-mile broadband access providers' market power are strikingly
similar.
Although competition among interexchange carriers flourished
following the Bell System break-up, the Bell ILECs subject to the MFJ
insisted (almost from the outset) that a structural approach enforcing
nondiscrimination for access services (thus enabling competition) was
unnecessary. To respond to these claims, in 1994, our firm, Economics and
Technology, Inc., jointly with Hatfield Associates, Inc. of Boulder,
Colorado, were engaged by (old) AT&T and MCI to prepare a detailed
technical and economic analysis of the role of exchange access facilities.
The resulting study, The Enduring Local Bottleneck, demonstrated that
long after regulatory and judicial mandates had permitted competition to
arise in customer premises equipment, inside wiring, and long distance
services, the last-mile facilities (whether switched or dedicated) that
connected customers to the PSTN were available from a single source and
thus remained a "bottleneck.""' The conclusion of that study was clear:
Last-mile telecommunications infrastructure involves enormous capital
investments and persistently high fixed costs, and is characterized by
116. "Eyeballs" is a term of art used to refer to the target audience of mass media. In the
present context, it refers to those end users potentially able to view particular content and
applications on the Internet.
117. ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY, INC. & HATFIELD ASSOCIATES, INC., THE ENDURING
LOCAL BOTTLENECK: MONOPOLY POWER AND THE LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS (1994),
www.econtech.com/Bottleneck.pdf
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extensive economies of scale and of scope.' 18
Incumbency and other "first mover" advantages are massive, and
"greenfield" facilities-based entry by an entity with no existing
infrastructure is unrealistic-if not altogether impossible-as an economic
matter. In 1994, there was much speculation as to the potential entry of
cable television providers into the local telephone business, but it was not
until the advent of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) around 2005 that
such entry became feasible.'1 9 Even so, and as the FCC has recently noted,
no inference can be drawn that such entry by others can be anticipated from
a cable company's entry into the local telecommunications market:
We see no persuasive economic reason to predict that, just because a
cable company might find it profitable to make incremental
investments in a preexisting network, subsequent entrants also would
find it profitable to incur the costs of building an entire new network
from scratch. Indeed, given that an incumbent, such as a cable
company, may have an additional incentive to invest in facilities to
deter additional entry from potential rivals, even less can be inferred
about subsequent entrants from the fact that most cable companies
have found it profitable to upgrade their cable television networks to
provide telephone and data services. Supporting this view, we have
seen few new entrants in any domestic telecommunications markets
that have been willing to invest in a totally new wireline network, at
least to serve residential customers. 120
Our 1994 study was undertaken at a time when the U.S. Congress was
engaged in the massive rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934 that
resulted in the enactment of the 1996 Act. The 1996 Act preempted all
remaining state regulatory restrictions on local exchange service
competition and expanded the structural approach to nondiscrimination to
include competitive local services that relied upon incumbents' local
exchange facilities.121  In addition to guaranteeing competitors
comprehensive interconnection rights, section 251 required that ILECs
118. Idat 4.
119. According to the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the number of
cable telephone subscribers rose from 5.9 million in 2005 to 22.2 million in 2009. Cable
Phone Customers 1998-2009, CABLE: NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.ncta.com/Stats/CablePhoneSubscribers.aspx (last visited Nov. 16,
2010).
120. Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the
Phoenix, Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2010
FCC LEXIS 3841, para. 36 (2010) (citations omitted) [hereinafter QWest Phoenix
Forbearance Order].
121. Section 271 of the 1996 Act made provision for eliminating the MFJ's long
distance line of business restriction, permitting the incumbent Bell companies to offer long
distance services once local competition was established, in which case, so the argument
went, the incentive to discriminate against competitors would no longer exist. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 15 1(a), 1 10 Stat. 56 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 271).
124 Vol. 63
Number 1] BROADBAND INTERNETACCESS12
offer any requesting carrier "nondiscriminatory access to network elements
on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ..... 12 In its
initial implementation of section 25 1, the FCC required that ILECs provide
a broad set of unbundled network elements (UN-Es),12 3 which entrants used
(along with total service resale and a limited amount of their own facilities)
to expand their competitive local telecommunications service offerings and
their geographic footprints.124 The three-pronged approach to entry under
section 251 (interconnection of competitor-owned facilities, unbundled
access, and resale) reflected recognition by Congress and by the FCC that
economic barriers made it unrealistic to expect competitors ever to fully
replicate the incumbents' networks with their own facilities .' 2 1
The availability of wholesale UNEs permitted competitors to expand
their own networks gradually, giving them the ability to achieve a broad
geographic footprint and, in the case of enterprise customers, to be capable
of serving all of a customer's locations, while adding its own facilities
where committed revenues permitted recovery of their investment. Using
UNEs (and, in particular, the local loop-switching combination, known as
the UNE-Platform), carriers that had previously been competitive only in
the long distance market were able to offer residential customers an
alternative to ILEC local exchange service.126 Under its section 251
authority, the FCC also required ILECs to offer other carriers access to the
high frequency portion of the local loop, so that they could make a
competitive offering of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) high-speed Internet
access service even when the customer retained wireline voice telephone
service from the ELEC. 12 7
122. Id at 47U.S.C. §251(c)(3).
123. First Local Competition Order, supra note 111, at para. 4.
124. Id at para. 12.
125. See id. at para. 13-14 (citing Joint Managers' Statement, S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-
230, 104th Cong. 113, 121 (1996)).
126. "Today, the combination of unbundled elements called 'UNE-P' or 'UNE-
Platform'-a combination of unbundled loops, switching, transport and signaling-is the
most successful mode of competitive entry created by the 1996 Act, and its growth
substantially exceeds the alternative modes of entry." T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford,
& Christopher C. Klein, The Financial implications of the UNE-Platform: A Review of the
Evidence, 12 CommLAW CONSPECTUs 5, 6 (2004). Ironically, by the time this article was
published, the FCC had acceded to ILEC demands for the elimination of UNE-Platform, and
CLECs that had depended upon UNE-P to serve residential customers were no longer viable
competitors. See Press Release, AT&T Corp., AT&T Announces Second-Quarter 2004
Earnings, Company to Stop Investing in Traditional Consumer Services; Concentrate
Efforts on Business Markets (July 22, 2004), http://www.corp.att.corm/news/2004/07/22-
13163 ("As a result of recent changes in regulatory policy governing local telephone
service, AT&T will no longer be competing for residential local and standalone long
distance (LD) customers.").
127. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
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The details of how the implementation of section 251 devolved from
the comprehensive requirements of the 1996 Local Competition Order128 to
the largely decimated set of IJNEs that survived the 2003 Triennial Review
and 2005 Triennial Review Remand Orders 12 9 is generally beyond the
scope of this Article, except with respect to "elements" and capabilities that
relate specifically to the provision of broadband Internet access. However,
there are several policy judgments that the FCC's broadband access
deregulation has in common with other deregulatory policies adopted by
the FCC during the Bush years, including the decision to cut off competitor
access to numerous UNEs, the maintenance of special access pricing
flexibility, and the various forbearance decisions. First, the FCC embraced
the notion (promoted by ILECs) that nonfacilities-based competition was
detrimental to ILEC investment incentives and that, despite significant
empirical evidence to the contrary, such competition was not a legitimate
contributor to the long-term competitive objectives of the 1996 Act.
Second, although the FCC, between 2000 and 2008, had relied repeatedly
upon the "investment incentive" 30 rationale, it never looked back to
reexamine the result of this "predictive judgment." In that regard, our 1994
Enduring Local Bottleneck study's "predictive judgments" as to the
realistic prospects for facilities-based local last-mile entry have turned out
to have been far more prescient than those that had been advanced-and
relied upon-by the FCC.'13 1
Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147 and
Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912, para. 6 (1999).
128. See First Local Competition Order, supra note I111, at para. 366.
129. See Triennial Review Order, supra note 45; Unbundled Access to Network
Elements, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533 (2005) [hereinafter Triennial Review
Remand Order].
130. See, e.g., Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R.
3696, para. 7 (1999) ("Unbundling rules that encourage competitors to deploy their own
facilities in the long run will provide incentives for both incumbents and competitors to
invest and innovate.") [hereinafter UNE Remand Order]; id. at para. 46 ("We agree with the
incumbent LECs' concerns regarding the preservation of their investment incentives."); see
also Triennial Review Order, supra note 45, at para. 178 ("In general, the incumbent LECs
and equipment manufacturers take the position that unbundling deters both incumbent LEC
and competitive LEC capital investment."). The FCC has relied most strongly on the
"investment incentives" argument in connection with broadband services. See, e.g.,
Triennial Review Order, supra note 45, at para. 541; Triennial Review Remand Order,
supra note 129, at paras. 11, 40.
131. Despite the absence of any hard evidence in support of the ILECs' "regulation-
discourages-investment" claim, its proponents persist in advancing this argument, perhaps
believing that if it is repeated often enough, it will come to be accepted as fact. A recent
reiteration of this same theme was offered by Janusz A. Ordover, Greg Shaffer, and Doug
Fontaine in an unpublished "Vodafone Public Policy" series paper, "The Economics of
Price Discrimination," commissioned by Vodafone and submitted to the FCC in an ex parte
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The FCC also began to make various "predictive judgments" about
competition based upon the fallacy that a CLEC's deployment of facilities
at a particular location was evidence that the CLEC (or another competitive
provider) could justify the investment to deploy facilities at any "similar"
location in the MSA. 132 As the FCC's reliance upon this predictive
competition analysis expanded, local competition (other than from the
uniquely facilities-based cable CLEC) actually began to shrink. Only
recently, in its Order133 denying Qwest's Petition for Forbearance in the
Phoenix MSA,' 3 has the FCC demonstrated an awareness of the theoretical
and factual flaws underlying the analytical framework it had been using to
assess the status of competitive telecommunications markets.
Recognizing the theoretical and empirical concerns associated with
duopoly, the Commission, in the Qwest Omaha Forbearance Order,
offered three predictive judgments, which it concluded would mitigate
those concerns. It first predicted that Qwest would continue to make
wholesale facilities, such as DSO, DSl, and DS3 facilities, available to
competitors at "competitive rates and terms." Second, and relatedly, it
predicted that non-cable competitors could "rely on the wholesale
access rights and other rights they have under sections 251(c) and
section 271 ... [to] minimize[] the risk of duopoly and of coordinated
behavior or other anticompetitive conduct in this market." Third, it
predicted that the areas where Cox currently had facilities would see
further investment by Cox and by other competitors even without
access to unbundled loops or transport.. .. Upon further consideration,
we find that these predictions have not been borne out by subsequent
developments, were inconsistent with prior Commission findings, and
filing on April 23, 2010 in GN Docket No. 09-191 and WC Docket No. 07-52. Janusz A.
Ordover et al., The Economics of Price Discrimination, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET
(Vodafone Group Plc. 20 10) [hereinafter Ordover et al.]. A central theme of the Ordover et
al. paper is the authors' claim that "[c]ontrary to the position taken by some net neutrality
proponents, the Commission's proposed ban on price discrimination can have a significant
deleterious effect on the incentives of broadband access providers to undertake necessary
investments in network innovation and expansion." Id. at 28. The paper contains no actual
data or analysis to support this claim or any of the purported negative (yet entirely
unquantified) economy-wide welfare impacts that the authors describe. Moreover, the
authors conveniently ignore the fact that any increase in telecommunications costs
confronting application and content providers to reach end users would have a negative
impact upon their willingness to invest-particularly if the payments being made to the
access providers amount to a transfer of some portion of the application and content
providers' potential economic profits-an outcome that would also have negative welfare
impacts. An analysis such as that proffered by Ordover et al. that ignores the economic
effects of activities dependent upon Internet access services cannot be considered as either
complete or remotely accurate.
132. Triennial Review Remand Order, supra note 129, at paras. 87-90.
133. See Qwest Phoenix Forbearance Order, supra note 120, at paras. 33-34.
134. Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(c) in the
Phoenix Arizona Metropolitan Statistical Area, WC Docket No. 09-135 (filed Mar. 24,
2009).
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are not otherwise supported by economic theory.' 35
Nowhere has the FCC been more aggressive in eliminating competitor
access than in the area of mass market broadband. While continuing to
recognize significant impairment in certain legacy last-mile facilities,'316 the
FCC, in its 2003 Triennial Review Order, nonetheless eliminated I1LECs'
obligation to offer unbundled access to: (1) the high-frequency portion of
the local loop (HFPL) (also referred to as "line sharing"), used by so-called
"Data CLECs" to provide DSL to mass market residential and small
business customers; (2) hybrid fiber-coaxial cable (HIFC loops; and (3) so-
called "greenfield" fiber loops. 3 7 The FCC swept away these UNEs largely
based upon broad generalizations about competitive growth. For example,
in support of its decision to end line sharing, the FCC concluded that its
earlier findings about "local competition and the lack of viable alternatives
for a provider of broadband services"3 no lneapplied, and offered in
its place a nonspecific assessment to the effect that, while "these
circumstances have not been completely reversed, significant strides have
been made by competitors in the local market." 39 The FCC also explicitly
relied upon section 706 as justification for accepting "some level of
impairment," because of the countervailing objective of encouraging more
rapid deployment of broadband by the incumbent providers.14 0 However,
the TRO, like other FCC orders from this era, contains little analysis on the
factual basis for expecting the elimination of wholesale access to the high
frequency portion of the loop to lead to increased investment levels.
In the TRO, the FCC also found evidence of significant wholesale
availability of the HFPL, noting that
we can no longer find that competitive LECs are unable to obtain the
HFPL from other competitive LECs through line splitting. For
example, the largest non-incumbent LEC provider of xDSL service,
Covad, recently announced plans to offer ADSL service to "more of
AT&T's 50 million consumer customers" through line splitting.'14'
But the FCC never took a second look at this finding after the AT&T
and SBC merger-i.e., once there was no longer an AT&T CLEC to split
135. Qwest Phoenix Forbearance Order, supra note 120, at paras. 33-34 (citations
omitted).
136. See Triennial Review Order, supra note 45, at paras. 248-49.
137. See id. at paras. 237, 247, 275. The FCC made this finding notwithstanding the fact
that "[tlhe record fuirther indicate[d] that FTTH loops display several economic and
operational entry barriers in common with copper loops-that is, the costs of FTTH loops are
both fixed and sunk, and deployment is expensive." Id. at para. 274.
138. Id. at para. 259 (citing Line Sharing Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 20938, paras. 53, 56
(1999)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at para. 173.
14 1. 1d. atpara. 259.
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lines with a data CLEC, such as Covad.
Other FCC decisions made it still harder for entrants to provide
broadband Internet access in competition with the ILEC and cable provider.
Shortly after the TRO, the FCC granted the Verizon, SBC, Qwest, and
BellSouth petitions for forbearance from their section 271 obligations for
all of the broadband elements for which the FCC, in the TRO, had found a
lack of impairment. As in the TRO, the decision to eliminate RBOC
broadband access provisioning obligations relies less upon market analysis
than upon broad generalizations about investment incentives and
"emerging" intermodal competition.142  Finally, with its various
reclassification decisions, and in particular in its BWIA Order, the FCC
removed the issue of broadband competition from any fuirther consideration
under section 251 criteria by making broadband Internet access capability
unreachable by competitors as a wholesale telecommunications service.143
B. Reevaluation of FCC Competition Analysis Needs to Extend to
Broadband Access
There are several assumptions and predictions that appear frequently
in the FCC's broadband-related decisions. Although it has relied upon these
assumptions and predictions repeatedly over the past decade, the FCC has
never gone back to analyze the actual experience under deregulation in
sufficient detail to determine if its predictions were correct.
Assumption/Prediction #1: That permitting I1LECs and cable
companies to exclude LEC and ISP competitors from using the facilities-
based incumbents' broadband facilities is (a) necessary to promote
investment by incumbents; (b) likely to provide greater incentives for
investment by competitors; or (c) the necessary and best approach to
implementing the policy stated in section 706.
Reality: I1LEC and cable company broadband investment decisions (as
well as those of other CLECs) depend critically upon available revenues
and anticipated costs. Deployment data, including that contained in the
record of the National Broadband Plan proceeding, demonstrates that
142. Petition for Forbearance of the Verizon Telephone Companies Pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 160(c), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 21496, n.66 (2004)
[hereinafter Section 271 Forbearance Order] ("The preconditions for monopoly appear
absent . . .. [W]e see the potential for this market to accommodate different technologies
such as DSL, cable modems, utility fiber to the home, satellite and terrestrial radio.") (citing
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 14
F.C.C.R. 2398, para. 48 (1999)). Some six years later, the FCC now expresses serious
reservations about competition under the ILEC-cable duopoly that has emerged. QWest
Phoenix Forbearance Order, supra note 120, at para. 82. The other predicted competition
for mass market broadband access services, including competitors on mntermodal platforms,
has still yet to materialize. See id at paras. 82-83.
143. See BWIA Order, supra note 24, at paras. 18-19.
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facilities-based providers may well not make broadband investments in
areas that do not satisfy standard investment criteria--e.g., high-cost
(remote) or low-revenue (low-income) areas--even with the incentive of
deregulation.'"4 Conversely, where the incentive to invest has existed,
broadband deployment has occurred even in the presence of regulation . 45
Insulating ILECs and cable companies from wholesale obligations
means that they obtain the benefits of market power that they would not
have in the presence of additional competitors. However, there is no
assurance that the incumbents will use the supracompetitive profits that
they derive from serving customers in one area to build out to customers in
remote, higher cost, and/or lower income areas. Verizon's decision to shed
those portions of its operating footprint that consist mainly of rural
customers rather than submit to pressures to extend broadband deployment
to such areas provides compelling evidence of this reality. As to competitor
investment, with the exception of cable companies, the FCC has not
demonstrated (nor could it) that CLEC investment (with the exception of
cable companies) has increased as a result of the elimination of broadband
unbundling requirements.
Assumption/Prediction #2: That "emerging" intermodal competition
will expand consumer options beyond the duopoly of wireline ILEC and
cableco-provided access.14
Reality: For more than a decade, the FCC has relied upon the
anticipated presence of "intermodal" competition, including (among others)
broadband over power lines, satellite, fixed microwave, and, finally,
wireless. However, the FCC's own data show that the reality has not come
even remotely close to meeting such expectations. According to the FCC's
most recent report on High-Speed Services for Internet Access (Status as of
December 31, 2008), the combined categories of satellite, fixed wireless,
and "power line and other" accounted for just over one percent of total
fixed broadband in June 2005 and remained at essentially that same level
(it had actually decreased slightly) as of December 2008.1 47 In its National
144. See id. at para. 19.
145. In the wake of the 1996 Act (from 1997 to 2001), a period of decidedly increasing
regulation, Verizon undertook $48.8 billion in additional telephone plant in service (TPIS),
as compared to TPIS additions of $35.4 billion during the subsequent period of deregulation
(from 2002 to 2006)--meaning that Verizon spent 37.7 percent more on
telecommunications plant during the period of regulation than the subsequent period of
deregulation. (This thirty-six percent growth represents the growth attributable to both of
Verizon's predecessor companies: Bell Atlantic and non-RBOC GTE. Bell Atlantic's
individual TPIS additions experienced growth of more than fifty-seven percent during the
same period.) See FCC, ARMIS USOA REPoRT 43-02 tbl. B-l .B. (years ending 1997-
2006).
146. See, e.g., Section 271 Forbearance Order, supra note 142, at para. 22.
147. I'Nus. A1NA.LYsis & TECH. DivisioN, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, HIGH-
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Broadband Plan, the FCC recommends that a significant amount of new
spectrum be allocated for broadband uses, but still acknowledges that
"[w]ireless broadband may not be an effective substitute in the foreseeable
future for consumers seeking high-speed connections at prices competitive
with wireline offers."148
Assumption/Prediction #3: That because broadband involves new
(rather than legacy) facilities, incumbents and new entrants have the same
opportunities for deployment.'4 9
Reality: This conclusion partakes of both the "new technology"
fallacy and the FCC's ongoing misconceptions about the ability of
competitors to replicate an incumbent's network in its entirety. Broadband
access facilities are deployed incrementally to carriers' (or cable
companies') preexisting networks. For the ILEC, incumbency and the
existence of a legacy network provide both unique cost advantages and
unique revenue opportunities. As we discuss more fully below, the time has
passed for the FCC to reassess the factual evidence with respect to
competition, to acknowledge that competitors are unable to duplicate
incumbents' ubiquitous network access facilities, and to realign its policies
according to these market realities.
Ironically, while the FCC has premised the various steps in its
comprehensive deregulation of broadband access services upon an
expectation of impending competitive entry, these actions have had the
effect of frustrating and discouraging new entry and creating a stampede of
exits from the competitive telecommunications market. Indeed, it is
difficult to square the various deregulatory initiatives for broadband access
with the FCC's recent finding that "the [facilities-based wireline
broadband] industry will probably always have a relatively small number
of facilities-based competitors" 150 or with the DOJ's conclusion that
wireline broadband services are characterized by "the presence of large
economies of scale, which preclude having many small suppliers and thus
often lead to oligopolistic market structures. 5
C. Reconciling Recent FCC Decisions with Existing Policies on
SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 9, tbl. 1 (2010).
148. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 104, at 41 (citing Robert C. Atkinson &
Ivy E. Schultz, COLUMBIA INSTITUTE FOR TELE-INFORMATioN, BROADBAND IN AMERICA:
WHERE IT IS AND WHERE IT Is GOING (ACCORDING To BROADBAND SERVICE PROVIDERS) 7
(2009)).
149. Triennial Review Order, supra note 45, at para. 227.
150. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 104, at 36.
151. Id. at 62 n.4 (citing Economic Issues in Broadband Competition: A National
Broadband Plan for Our Future, Ex Parte Submission of the United States Department Of
Justice I11 (filed Jan. 4, 20 10)).
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Broadband Internet Access
Shortly after the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC's Comcast decision,
the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry in which it proposed to classify
broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service, while
maintaining "restrained oversight" of broadband Internet access service.152
In what the FCC describes as a "third way"7-that is, something other than
complete deregulation or the reimposition of fuill Title 11 obligations-the
NOI suggests that the FCC could:
classify the Internet connectivity portion of broadband Internet service
as a telecommunications service but . .. simultaneously forbear, using
the section 10 authority Congress delegated to us, from all but a small
handful of provisions necessary for effective implementation of
universal service, competition and small business opportunity, and
consumer protection policies.153
Leaving aside the question of whether such a broad-brush approach to
forbearance comports with the statutory requirements, the larger concern is
whether the FCC can achieve its stated objectives with regard to an open
and competitive Internet if it simply reclassifies Internet access, but fails to
adopt the additional steps necessary to ensure that ILECs, cable companies,
and wireless carriers make broadband "bottleneck" facilities available in
accordance with all of the provisions of Title 11 that support the competitive
provision of telecommunications and information services.154
Indeed, just a few months prior to the Chairman's "third way"
proposal, the FCC had released its Congressionally-mandated National
Broadband Plan, in which it specifically noted that additional wireline
facilities-based broadband entry (beyond the incumbent LEC and the
152. Framework for Broadband Internet Service, Notice of Inquiry, 25 F.C.C.R. 7866,
para. 7 (2010).
153. Id. at para. 28 (citation omitted).
154. While Professor Crawford accurately describes the problems created by failing to
require the provision of broadband last-mile transmission on a nondiscriminatory basis as
common carrier services, her proposed solution appears to be confined to last- and middle-
mile fiber optic transmission facilities, and not copper, coaxial cable, or wireless. See
Crawford, supra note 115, at 928-29. To achieve Professor Crawford's solution would
require extensive deployment of last-mile and middle-mile fiber facilities where few exist
today. Whereas some form of "terrestrial, fixed broadband infrastructure capable of
supporting actual download speeds of at least 4 Mbps" is presently available to ninety-five
percent of all households (and a slightly higher percentage of businesses), fiber-to-the-
premises (FTTP) is projected to become available, over the next several years, to merely
fifteen percent of U.S. households. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 104, at 20, 42.
While Congress may in the long run determine that the massive investment required to
attain ubiquitous FTTP deployment is in the public interest, this resource-intensive solution
could only be achieved at a significant cost, and in any event not for many years in the
fuiture. In our view, there is no justification for deferring the conditions necessary to achieve
net neutrality by tying it to a technology that currently exists in a relatively small portion of
the United States, when a competitive Internet access market could be achieved today by
requiring nondiscriminatory access on a technology-neutral basis.
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incumbent cable provider) is unlikely:
Building broadband networks-especially wireline-requires large
fixed and sunk investments. Consequently, the industry will probably
always have a relatively small number of facilities-based competitors,
at least for wireline service. Bringing down the cost of entry for
facilities-based wireline services may encourage new competitors to
enter in a few areas, but it is unlikely to create several new facilities-
based entrants competing across broad geographic areas.' 55
The same conclusion with respect to broadband competition appears
in an exparte submission by the DOJ (which the FCC cites in the National
Broadband Plan report):
We do not find it especially helpful to define some abstract notion of
whether or not broadband markets are 'competitive.' Such a dichotomy
makes little sense in the presence of large economies of scale, which
preclude having many small suppliers and thus often lead to
oligopolistic market structures. The operative question in competition
policy is whether there are policy levers that can be used to produce
superior outcomes, not whether the market resembles the textbook
model of perfect competition. In highly concentrated markets, the
policy levers often include: (a) merger control policies; (b) limits on
business practices that thwart innovation (e.g., by blocking
interconnection); and (c) public policies that affirmatively lower entry
barriers facing new entrants and new technologies. 156
While reinstating Internet access to its appropriate Title 11 status will
certainly put the FCC in a better position to foster competition than if the
service remained outside its direct jurisdiction, this policy change alone is
unlikely to prevent incumbent broadband providers from consolidating
their market power and continuing to discriminate against nonaffiliated
ISPs and application and content providers.
The competitive realities of retail and wholesale access markets,
which the FCC is just now acknowledging in other regulatory contexts,
should inform the FCC's approach to the regulation of Internet access. Not
long after releasing its Reclassification N0, the FCC issued a decision
denying Qwest forbearance from various forms of retail and wholesale
regulation for services in the Phoenix, Arizona MSA. 157 In that Order, the
FCC admits that the competitive analysis used in its forbearance decisions
in recent years has been flawed on both theoretical and factual levels. The
FCC rejects both the theoretical and factual foundations for earlier
decisions that had relied upon "predicted" competitive growth based upon
anecdotal and "proxy" evidence of some competitive presence. Instead, the
155. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 104, at 36.
156. Id. at 62 n.4 (citing Economic Issues in Broadband Competition: A National
Broadband Plan for Our Future, Ex Parte Submission of the United States Department Of
Justice 11I (filed Jan. 4, 20 10)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See Qwest Phoenix Forbearance Order, supra note 120.
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FCC now adopts a comprehensive antitrust type of market power analysis,
with a strong emphasis upon market definition, market share, and other
quantitative indicia of actual competition.
Unlike some of its earlier forbearance orders, this time the FCC views
markets as "competitive" if the level of competition is sufficient to
constrain the incumbent's ability to "profitably impose a small but
significant and nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP)."' 18 Consistent with
its precedents, the FCC finds that the relevant geographic market is the
individual customer location because customers cannot be expected to
relocate in response to an SSNIP;159 in addition, the FCC recognizes that in
order for an entrant to serve a multilocation enterprise customer, the entrant
must be able to serve the entirety of the customer's requirements at all of
its business locations. 160 The FCC examines the actual levels of
competition, as well as the likelihood of de novo entry or supply-side
substitution, separately for each of the various product markets (enterprise
and residential, retail and wholesale), and concludes that neither effective
competition nor the short-term potential for effective competition, exists in
any of them.'16' With respect to enterprise services, the FCC's analysis
places particular emphasis upon competition at the wholesale level, which
it finds to be almost nonexistent.162 While it continues to consider
"6potential competition" (in accordance with the directive of the federal
courts), the FCC also recognizes that the "potential" needs to be based on a
realistic expectation of either de novo entry or supply-side substitution.16 1
In the Qwest Order, the FCC quotes extensively from earlier FCC
decisions that had recognized the presence of formidable entry barriers and
appears to re-embrace its earlier interpretation of the 1996 Act as
supporting the development of local competition through both facilities-
and nonfacilities-based entry.'64 And, as noted above, the FCC determined
that the expansion of facilities by cable companies is not predictive of new
entry by other competitors that lack cable's existing infrastructure platform
158. Id. at para 5 6; see also id. at para. 42 & n. 142-43.
159. Id. at para. 64.
160. Id. at para. 74.
161. Id. at paras. 71-72, 81-86, 88-91.
162. See id. at para. 73.
163. Id at para. 72.
164. See id. at para. 32. Explaining the advantages of a market that includes
nonfacilities-based competitors over a cable/ILEC duopoly, the FCC states:
Were that level of competition sufficient to fu~lfill Congress' goals for telephone
services, the 1996 Act only would have needed to require interconnection. Instead,
Congress established means for additional competitors to enter without fully
duplicating the incumbent's local network. It is clear Congress wanted to enable
entry by multiple competitors through use of the incumbent LEC's network.
Id (citations omnitted).
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and that the cable/ThLEC duopoly cannot be relied upon to produce
competitive conditions.16 1
In this forbearance analysis,166 the FCC here reinforces its theoretical
market power analysis with empirical findings regarding the status of
competition, concluding, inter alia, that:
* Even the largest CLECs rely upon ILEC last-mile facilities to
connect to the vast majority of the enterprise customers they
serve.16
* Contrary to the FCC's previously stated expectations, ILECs have
not continued to provide competitors with wholesale inputs at fair
and reasonable prices after the FCC had forborne from requiring
it-an outcome that the FCC now concedes should not have been
surprising, noting that "assuming that Qwest is profit-maximizing,
we would expect it to exploit its monopoly position as a wholesaler
and charge supracompetitive rates, especially given that (absent
regulation) Qwest may have the incentive to foreclose competitors
from the market altogether."16 8
* Intermodal alternatives (such as fixed microwave service for
enterprise customers) have not emerged or are not available at
anywhere near the level necessary to represent a competitive
alternative to ILEC special access services.169
The analytical framework used in Qwest would also be well-suited for
application in any FCC proceeding involving competition policy. In
particular, although the FCC suggests that a somewhat different approach
may be called for in broadband proceedings, the rationalizations that have
been put forward for treating broadband differently from other types of
access should not be elevated over the compelling competitive concerns
expressed by the FCC in the Qwest ruling. Today, according to the FCC's
National Broadband Plan report, seventy-eight percent of all U.S. housing
units have a choice of two terrestrial broadband providers (the ILEC and
cable company), but the number of customers that can select among three
165. Id. at para. 30 ("[T]he move from monopoly to duopoly is not alone necessarily
sufficient to justify' forbearance ... "This is because "economic theory holds that firms
operating in a market with two or a few firms (iLe., an oligopoly) are likely to recognize their
mutual interdependence and, unless certain conditions are met, in many cases may engage in
strategic behavior, resulting in prices above competitive levels.").
166. In a Public Notice issued the same day as the Q'west Order, the FCC asked whether
it was appropriate to extend the analytical framework applied in Qlwest to other forbearance
proceedings. Public Notice, FCC WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU SEEKS COMMENT ON
APPLYING THE QWEST PHOENIX FORBEARANCE ORDER ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK IN SIMILAR
PROCEEDINGS, DA No. 10-1115 (June 22, 2010).
167. QWest Phoenix Forbearance Order, supra note 120, at para. 87.
168. Id. at para. 34.
169. See id. at paras. 69, 89.
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(or more) providers is far smaller (four percent) than the number that has
only one provider (thirteen percent) or no broadband availability at all (five
percent). 170 The retail access duopoly that the FCC dismisses as ineffective
in disciplining rates, terms, and conditions for other wireline
telecommunications services is no different in the broadband context-
except to the extent that the absence of wholesale competition, rather than
being a de facto condition, is legally sanctioned.
While the FCC appears to be struggling to justify restoring a
framework under which broadband Internet access is classified as
telecommunications and provided in a manner that shields retail
competitors from discriminatory practices by incumbent providers, there is
nothing particularly radical about this approach. In fact, a structural
approach that facilitates the expansion of retail competition is precisely
what has been adopted in Canada, where both ILECs and "cable carriers"
are required to offer wholesale high-speed access facilities to retail
competitors, at all speed options that the ILEC or cable carrier offers to its
own retail Internet customers. 17' The CRTC recently examined-and
soundly rejected-arguments by ILECs and cable companies that
wholesale access was no longer necessary to ensure retail competition. 1
The CRTC found that retail Internet access would not be competitive
without the continuation of a wholesale access requirement, finding that (1)
a cable/JILEC duopoly was not sufficient to protect consumers' interests,
and also that (2) nonwireline platforms, such as wireless and satellite, were
not presently substitutes for retail Internet services provisioned over
wireline facilities.' The CRTC thus found that, under these conditions, the
only reliable way to ensure retail Internet access competition was through
mandated wholesale access to high-speed ILEC and cable facilities.714
V. CONCLUSION: NET NEUTRALITY CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY
THE FULL RESTORATION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY ACCESS TO
BROADBAND LAST-MILE FACILITIES
As we have explained in some detail above, there is no technical basis
for any requirement that a broadband Internet access service come bundled
with any provider-supplied content. Facilities-based ISPs have the same
opportunity as any other ISP to offer their customers various content and
applications sold and priced separately from the underlying transmission.
170. NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, supra note 104, at 37 tbl.4-A.
17 1. Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC, supra note 23, at para. 10 n. I11 (citing CRTC
2006 and 2007 "Speed Matching" orders).
172. Id. at paras. 53-54.
173. Id at paras. 53-55.
174. Id. at para. 55.
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At the same time, under the current regulatory treatment of broadband
Internet access, the access provider is under no obligation to furnish the
underlying telecommunications service to rival content providers.
Declaring Internet access to be a bundled information service when it is
not, serves only to add deregulation to the numerous other advantages that
ILECs, cable providers, and wireless carriers have over competing stand-
alone downstream application and content providers-i.e., those that do not
also provide broadband access. This disparity in market position creates the
opportunity for a facilities-based broadband provider to leverage its market
power in the wireline or wireless Internet access market to discriminate
against, and hence competitively disadvantage, their nonvertically
integrated rivals.
The FCC is attempting to obliquely address the potential for such
vertical foreclosure through the promulgation of "third way" net neutrality
rules that would prohibit the integrated provider's ability to favor its own
content or discriminate against rival content providers. A prohibition of this
sort targets conduct-after the fact-but does little if anything to diminish
the opportunity or incentives for such discrimination. If the FCC merely
fixes its classification problem with respect to Internet access services, but
fails to address the competitive consequences that have resulted from the
misclassification, it will only solve, at the most, half of the problem.
Along with reclassification, the FCC needs also to determine what
will be the most effective and efficient way to prevent abuses of market
power by the owners of last-mile facilities. There are several reasons why
ex post enforcement-which requires after-the-fact policing of
discriminatory behavior either on the FCC's own initiative or, more likely,
in response to specific, formal complaints filed by consumers, third-party
competitive content or applications providers, or others-is less effective
than an ex ante structural approach that removes the opportunity and
incentives for discriminatory behavior in the first place. With the Internet
and its derivative application and content markets moving along at
lightning speed, the "snail's pace" at which the FCC responds when
confronted with controversial issues 1 15 can permit aggrieved parties to
suffer extensive damage while awaiting relief, and, as such, affords no real
deterrent to discriminatory conduct by dominant incumbents.
The FCC should know from years of experience that enforcement is
slow, costly, and inefficient at addressing pervasive or systematic
misconduct. Complainants in FCC proceedings have the burden of proof,
but are often afforded minimal discovery opportunities to develop the
175. See, e.g., Core Comm., 531 F.3d 849 (2008) (compelling the FCC by mandamus to
resolve issues on reciprocal compensation that had been outstanding since 2000).
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evidentiary record.176 And because any given enforcement action typically
targets only one particular incident or manifestation of misconduct, it is
likely that the discrimination may persist for extended periods of time
and/or be perpetrated against multiple competitors before any sanction or
injunction is applied. In most cases, the penalties for unlawful conduct,
when they are ultimately imposed, fall far short of the gain realized by the
perpetrator from its unlawful conduct.177 The potential for such conduct on
the part of dominant telecommunications carriers has been recognized for
many decades, and needs to be addressed before the fact, not afterwards.178
The mechanisms adopted in Computer HI and in the 1996 Act represent a
middle ground between outright structural separation with explicit line-of-
business restrictions and the alternative of ceding all adjacent
telecommunications and information services markets to the incumbent
last-mile monopolies.
These extremes can be avoided if the FCC uses its existing authority
to require that a nondiscriminatory offering of "basic" broadband access be
made available, on an unbundled and nondiscriminatory basis, by all
dominant facilities-based providers to their nonfacilities-based competitors.
The findings in the National Broadband Plan and the evidence
accumulating before the FCC in various pending proceedings all support a
reversal of FCC decisions that find that competitors are not "impaired"
without access to incumbents' unbundled broadband access facilities, at
forward-looking, cost-based rates. These empirical results are completely
consistent with what economic theory would predict with respect to the
duplication of an extensive physical network. Although some of the factors
affecting network expansions differ between the enterprise and mass
market sectors, additional replication of the ubiquitous facilities already
deployed by wireline ILECs and cable companies and by wireless carriers
to provide Internet access is equally unlikely.
With a competitive market at both wholesale and retail levels,
176. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.720(b), 1.721(a)(5), 1.729 (a) (1999) (permitting
complainant ten initial and five follow-up interrogatories). In recognition of the tendency for
complaints to go unresolved for extended periods of time, the FCC in 1998 adopted an
"accelerated docket" procedure that FCC staff may use in particular cases, but at its
discretion. See Biennial Review 2000 Staff Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 21084, paras. 172-73
(2000); see also 47 C.F.R. § 1.730 (1999).
177. For example, if it costs $40 to park a car in a parking lot versus a $10 fine for
parking in a no-parking zone, it is cheaper to park illegally and pay the $10 than to park
legally for $40. Similarly, if the fine for illegal parking is $1,000 but there is only a one-in-
one-thousand chance of getting a fine, all but the most risk-averse drivers would opt to take
their chances and park illegally.
178. Professor Crawford comes to a similar conclusion about the futility of
nondiscrimination mandates and after-the-fact enforcement efforts. See Crawford, supra
note 115, at 916-19.
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application and content providers will have a choice of multiple Internet
access providers to reach their consumer "eyeballs" and will thus be
inoculated against attempted discriminatory conduct by any particular
provider. Conversely, without the ability to profit from this type of
discrimination, such practices are unlikely to be pursued by those offering
broadband Internet access at the retail level. Thus, by restoring
competitors' right to purchase "basic" broadband access as a platform for
retail Internet access competition, the FCC has the opportunity to create
more competition, with less regulation, than by reclassification alone. If
real and effective competition for retail mass market Internet access is able
to develop, that competitive marketplace will operate to enforce the FCC's
net neutrality principles, and will do so far more efficiently, effectively,
and transparently than ongoing FCC involvement in the network
management and other day-to-day operating decisions of wireline and
wireless broadband Internet access providers. The result: a far more
effective, and far less regulatory, strategy for achieving the important net
neutrality goals.
139Number 11
140 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63
